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I argue that there are two interpretations of the Marxist dialectic, both of which examine 
how human beings interact with objects around them conceptually and how society evolves over 
time, from different points of view. In the present paper, I undertake three tasks. First, I 
demonstrate that there is a clear difference between these two strains of Marxist thought which I 
here call humanist and determinist. Second, I show how Marxist thought has evolved from Hegel 
and Marx to the present in light of these two different models. Last, I argue that the determinist 
model is flawed, and that the humanist model stands as a more solid logical and epistemological 
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Chapter One: Purpose and Methodology 
 I. Purpose and Goals of the Paper 
In this particular essay, my research goal is to examine varying interpretations of the dialectical 
model used by Marxists and to provide an analysis of what the dialectic meant to Marx and those 
who followed him. Thus the question I sought to answer was what the dialectic meant to various 
writers, and what was the difference in the meaning of that word to - and in the model of the 
dialectic used by - Marxist theorists. The present section details both my answer, and the 
methodology I use, to interpret the texts in question. 
First, my answer to the question “what is the Marxist dialectic?” led me to two different 
interpretations of Marxism: one is humanist, the other economically determinist. The former 
places the human being as a creative individual at the centre of the dialectical process, hence, 
humanist. The latter argues that the social organization in which human beings live is driven by 
economic forces such as the struggle over the ownership of the tools we use to create products in 
society. By and large, this latter view holds the economic element of society to be what 
determines the structure of the society, and discounts the human element. That is, determinism 
sees humans in society as merely the embodiment of these social forces, playing roles 
determined by their position in the distribution of power over the economy. Also, the humanist 
model remains a conceptual model: it is a method by which human beings understand the social 
structures around them, and the way they interact with them. The determinist model, however, 
argues that the dialectic is an ontology, that all of reality obeys dialectical laws.  
Marxist thought demonstrates a continuing tension between its humanist and economic 






emphasized the latter. After Marx’s death, Engels argued that nature itself obeyed dialectical 
laws, and the debate has continued since, though it has not always been explicit. At times, it is 
implied by the manner in which a Marxist thinker describes the problem with which he or she is 
confronted. It is my goal then to: 1) tease out the differences between the two models; 2) 
demonstrate how the dialectic was developed by Hegel and Marx, and how it was used by later 
Marxist writers; and 3) establish the humanist argument to be a better model for Marxist theory 
as opposed to the determinist model, and to clarify the humanist position so that it might be used 
by future writers. I recognize that some authors, like Marx, at times fall on both sides of the 
divide, and I will show why this is so. I am hesitant to suggest a ‘permanent’ solution to the 
tension, as it is something with which Marxism will always struggle.  
II. Research Method 
The study of political theory, especially the history of ideas, occupies a slightly difficult position 
with regards to the theoretical models of political ‘science.’ The main body of the field remains 
in a struggle over what type of science it is that we use in studying politics, a debate that has, on 
occasion, intruded into the sub-field of political theory. David Easton, perhaps rightly, once 
accused those who work within the discipline of political theory of being historicist, a charge that 
political theory still struggles with.1 While we lack, in the sense of Thomas Kuhn, a proper 
paradigm--a dominant methodology, epistemology, and school of thought2--there are various 
schools that describe what is to be studied within this discipline, with varying degrees of support 
and effectiveness. I do not wish to enter into a debate over which methodology is best, only to 
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     Gunnell, John G., Political Theory: Tradition and Interpretation, (Cambridge: Winthrop Publishers, Inc., 1979), 
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provide a brief discussion of the various schools, and where my own methodology fits into the 
scheme of things. 
Easton represents, in some sense, the positivist or behavioural school, that came to 
dominate much of the discipline of political science at the mid-point of the 20
th
 century. I have 
already mentioned his thoughts on political theory’s historicity; that is its tendency, in his mind, 
to uncritically impose modern values onto the writing of the past.3 The positivist school is what 
one might define as ‘classical science,’ but this is slightly disingenuous. Positivism does not 
necessarily require a view that there is an ontological truth to be discovered, but instead that one 
should strive for a value-less study of the facts.4 One should strive to eliminate subjective bias as 
much as possible, and instead seek to determine what is factual in any given area of study. 
Positivism runs into trouble in the study of the history of ideas. Whether one can know, 
objectively, what an author ten, twenty, a hundred, or a thousand years in the past meant, 
especially given the gulf between cultures and time periods, not to mention differences in 
linguistic meaning, has been the subject of debate within the discipline of political theory for 
some time. As the reader may have guessed, I will not be using a positivist approach to study this 
particular issue. 
There are a few other broad schools in political theory. One is that of Leo Strauss and 
others like him who assert the presence of a tradition within the history of ideas, and this has a 
specific meaning for students of those ideas. Several schools have emerged from the reaction to 
the idea of the tradition: of particular concern here are the contextual (Oxford) approach and, for 
lack of a better term, the textual approach. The former can be seen in the work of Quentin 
Skinner, Eric Hirsch, as well as John Pocock and John Dunn. The latter can be seen in the work 
                                                           
3






of Hans-Georg Gadamer, Robin George Collingwood, and Wilhelm Dilthey, to name a few. 
Leo Strauss arrived at two positions: that political philosophy is a search for essential 
meaning or ‘the true,’ and that there is a tradition within the history of ideas that one can trace 
from Plato to the present (usually, one ends with Marx or Nietzsche).5 Strauss used these two 
concepts to attack both positivism and political philosophies of the past that he did not like, 
especially some of the modern schools of thought. For Strauss, the classical philosophy of the 
Greeks stood as the greatest contribution to political philosophy, providing both a filter through 
which later philosophers looked at politics,6 and a moral basis upon which one could rest in the 
face of tyranny in the modern age.7 Strauss argued that modern political theory and practice had 
abandoned the values of the past as the tradition evolved, and he blamed this primarily on 
Machiavelli. Instead of seeking the true and the good as did the Greeks, Machiavelli sought to 
deal with practical politics without any concern for a search for essential truth.8  Political 
philosophy according to Strauss should strive to argue for Platonic principles upon which one 
might base a political order, something Strauss believed had been abandoned in the modern age.9 
Strauss therefore saw Socrates, Plato, and the philosophers of Ancient Greece as representing the 
ideal form of political thought, since they strove to create a normative basis for a social order, 
something the true philosopher (read: the Straussian) could understand and make use of, even 
across centuries of time. Machiavelli, Marx, Nietzsche, and others of the ‘modern’ persuasion 
inverted this schema by placing the emphasis on facts/empirical knowledge and 
historical/contextual interpretation.  
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     Ibid., 6-9. 
5
     Strauss, Leo, What is Political Philosophy and Other Studies (Westport: The Free Press Corporation/Greenwood 
Press Publishers, 1959/1973/1975), 10-11, 27. 
6
     Ibid., 27. 
7
     Gunnell, 36-40. 
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The idea of the tradition emerges in Strauss when he argues that the ideas of the classical 
writers, and all who followed them, exist as a filter through which political philosophy interprets 
political life.10 Thus, Machiavelli responds to Cicero, Cicero to Aristotle and Plato--and by 
proxy, to Socrates-- Locke fights with Hobbes, and Marx and Nietzsche attack them all. The 
modern interpreter studies the past to understand what happens in the modern age, and looks for 
meaning in the great debate in which political philosophy has engaged for millenia.11 Strauss 
then argues that the tradition had been ‘deliberately’ undermined by Machiavelli in that he 
focussed on empiricism and practicality instead of that which is essential to human life.12 This 
began a long process of debasement through to the modern era, by which point political 
philosophy had largely died out.13 This explained in Strauss’ mind why the modern era had seen 
the rise of fascism and Communism, as both were the result of the deficiencies of the political 
philosophies of Marx, Nietszche, and others. In short, Strauss reads in a grand meaning to the 
tradition of political thought, which he uses as justification to attack the political movements of 
the modern day.14 
While there may be some analytical merit to Strauss’ method, in that it narrows down the 
field of study for the historian and also provides some grounds upon which to attack other 
modern schools of thought, I choose not to use it for this project. For a study on Marxism, 
removing Marx and Marxists from their historical context and attempting to posit their role in a 
“Great Debate”15 strikes me as defeating the very point of Marxism, to understand human beings 
in their contexts. I do accept the idea of a tradition within Marxism, but this is because the 
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     Strauss, 51-55. 
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writers of interest here tend to accept or at least use the concepts of Marx, Engels, and Hegel. For 
the purposes of this essay, the idea of a ‘tradition’ is strictly analytical. It is used solely to help 
the reader see some of the connections between the writers, particularly as their texts relate to the 
idea of the dialectic. 
The textual approach of Gadamer was based on his argument that one could not free 
oneself from the present in which one lived, but that despite linguistic, cultural, and temporal 
distance, one could still understand what an author wrote and what it means.16 This school tends 
to follow the idea that while various people in different time periods may interpret some 
elements of reality differently, they all share the same reality, and this is also true of the history 
of ideas.17 The act of interpretation is based on common linguistic meanings (Wittgensteinian 
‘language games,’ for example), and while one cannot fully escape the meaning established 
within one’s own context, one can still derive some common understanding from a given text. 
The process of interpretation is dialectical, where the interpreter and text interact to create a new 
set of ideas in the interpreter when he or she finishes a text. By reading it, one’s own perspective 
is changed, and the text comes to have new meaning to that person as well. 
The contextual approach arose as a reaction against the Straussian idea of a tradition, and, 
ironically, as with positivism, it often accused its opponents of reading modern values into the 
work of past thinkers. It differs from the textual school in trying to find meaning for what one 
writer says in a text based on the social context in which they lived. Where it differs from 
positivism is its argument that one ought to study the historical context of the author in question, 
and try to determine what he or she meant within that context. Positivism argues that science 
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should concern itself with discovering objective facts, something with which the contextual 
approach takes issue with. Skinner, Dunn, Pocock, and Hirsch all place emphasis on the idea that 
one ought to try and understand what the author meant, based on historical context, the audience 
to whom the text was directed, and the meaning of the text within the society one lived.18 So, 
what Marx wrote as a young man in Germany, while reasonably wealthy, in a piece that was 
meant as a doctoral dissertation, likely has a different meaning to Marx than it might have had he 
written it during the years of poverty he spent in London.  
Skinner’s approach moves away from pure contextualism. Since I intend to use Skinner’s 
approach, I shall outline it in brief here. Skinner wrote an attack on both the purely textual 
approach, Strauss, and the purely contextual approach. One cannot, he argued, divorce one’s own 
values and ideas from what one reads.19 So, merely reading the text ‘as it is,’ as Gadamer 
suggests, or as Strauss does, leads to the problem that one may insert meaning into a text that is 
not there, or clarity where there is none. This leads to two problems: one, that there may be a 
misreading of what the writer said; and two, that anachronisms can appear. The first occurs when 
one attempts to read the text in the sense of a grand tradition, or to look for a specific concept 
(the Social Contract, Separation of Powers, and so forth) in a text. One tends to find it, Skinner 
argued, reading the idea into a text even when it is not actually there.20 Anachronisms occur 
when one argues that a writer ‘anticipates’ a concept from a later time-period. This problem 
follows from the first, in that if one is looking to find an idea such as the social contract in 
writers before Hobbes, and finds something similar in Plato or Aristotle, one might be seeing a 
pattern where there is none.21 
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The contextual approach, Skinner argued, sometimes missed the point of interpretation. 
One cannot simply understand the context of a writer as if that explains what it is they said. 
Skinner argued that there is a difference between the reasons for why a text was written--the 
context-- and what the text actually meant.22 Skinner argued that each text was an action with a 
particular meaning, a particular audience, and a particular purpose, and that neither the text nor 
the context determines the meaning of the given source.23 The text in question must be 
understood as a specific question being analyzed at a certain time and place. 
In each writer’s case I attempt to place the writers in their proper historical context, and 
try to ascertain what the writers meant given their audience. In this, I follow the contextual 
approach that Skinner sets out. So, for example, when analyzing the young Marx, I provide at 
least a few words regarding his audience, what it meant in that context, and what the discussion 
in the text itself is about. I do, however, agree somewhat with Gadamer’s school of thought: 
while I am not living in the context of Marx, Lenin, or Althusser, it is still possible to 
comprehend the meaning of the original text to a reader in a meaningful way, as long as I am 
honest about my own bias and the effect of my own historical context on that interpretation. 
Unfortunately, none of the schools I have discussed here establish a fully-fleshed out 
methodological doctrine, and so I must pick and choose from amongst them what is best for this 
study. 
My method, then, is to describe the contextual background within which each writer 
produced his or her text, and to avoid inserting meaning into the work of various thinkers that 
they themselves may not have intended. Some Marxist thinkers did not examine the nature of the 
dialectical model in any kind of depth--Lenin, for example, takes the model he uses very much as 
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a given. Nevertheless, some form of dialectical model is present in the works of most Marxists: if 
it is not there, then in many ways they have abandoned the Marxist project, since Marx relied on 
the dialectical model in some form or another to explain his philosophy at all points in his career. 
That the model changed over time I will endeavour to prove by showing this change in Marx’s 
own work, and how it was variously interpreted throughout the ‘canon’ of Marxist thought.  
In summary, I use a combination of the Skinner’s approach and that of Gadamer. I 
readily accept that the social and historical context within which I am writing will have an 
impact on my interpretation of the texts: I was born and have lived during the last years of the 
collapsing Communist government of the USSR and during the subsequent rise of America to 
global dominance, and not during the height of early capitalism as did Marx. Nor am I writing, as 
Althusser, Miliband, and Poulantzas were, immediately following Stalin’s death, during the 
struggles to dig Marxism out from the baggage under which it found itself . Recognizing this, I 
endeavour to let the texts speak for themselves, to determine what it was that each author meant 
to do with each text given the context and the audience to whom it was directed.  
III. Outline of the Paper 
I begin my discussion of this topic with an analysis of Marxist literature, beginning with Hegel 
and Marx, and give a brief survey of the writings of some of the major writers to follow--Lenin, 
Luxemburg, Kautsky, and Gramsci, for example. I include these thinkers to show how the 
concept of the dialectic was developed, and how various thinkers used the idea after Marx. I limit 
myself to ending my review of Marxist literature with Althusser, Poulantzas, and Miliband, as 
well as a few modern interpreters--Alex Callinicos, for example, and Martin Carnoy--as the 
debate over how to use the dialectic within Marxism died down shortly after the Poulantzas-
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Miliband debate in the 1960s. I place the literature review first in order to demonstrate how 
Marx, Hegel, and Marxists have used and developed the dialectic over the course of the history 
of Marxist ideas, and to provide the reader with context for the third and fourth chapters. In 
these, I examine, first, determinism, providing more depth to the argument made by determinist 
Marxists. I critique it for failing on three points: failing to acknowledge the impact of human 
agency, providing predictive inaccuracy, and for being a tautological argument and therefore 
incapable of being tested. With this critique finished, I turn to humanist Marxism, establishing 
what the humanist position argues, and why it is superior to the determinist model. It is my 
argument that humanism does not fall prey to the three critiques I level against determinism, and 
that it therefore has more to offer to both political theory and practice for Marxism in the future. 
I finish with a brief summary of the paper as a whole, and some thoughts as to why this project is 
of value to Marxism and what it might mean for Marxist theory and practice. 
IV. Summary 
It is my goal to examine the conflict between determinist and humanist Marxism, as I do not 
believe that the debate between the two has been properly resolved, or that the tensions between 
these two variations of Marxism have been adequately examined or explained. It is also my goal 
to show that the humanist model has both analytical and normative value. It allows for a 
Marxism that is able to adapt to the times, but that never forgets the original purpose of Marx’s 
writings or of any form of socialism: to challenge exploitation and oppression, not to further it. It 
does this by providing a conceptual model that enables people to understand the effects of their 
actions and of others in society. In many respects, I view the humanist model to be far superior to 
the determinist model, and will demonstrate why this is so. 






evolved from Hegel to Marx, and on to Marxists of varying stripes, and how the debate between 
determinist and humanist Marxism has evolved. I do not endeavour to place Marx within a grand 
historical tradition, nor Marxists within a grand tradition of Marxism: each writer has his or her 
historical place, and will be considered on their own terms. What the dialectic means to 
determinist and humanist Marxism will be examined in the remainder of the text. To a certain 
extent, writing a review that analyzes the development of the dialectic over time means that I do 
accept the idea that ideas and concepts can evolve over time, but to this I would point out that 
Marxist thinkers consciously adopted the model that Marx, Engels, Kautsky, and Lenin 
developed, and this includes the idea of a dialectic in either its humanist or determinist form. 
Each writer used the idea for a different purpose. Some writers occasionally used both humanist 
and determinist models at various points in their careers.  
Thus the dialectical method of Marx has had an existence and a history of its own over 
time. My point is to show how each author used it and why, and what form of dialectical method 
he or she used. Through this, I hope to demonstrate the difference between the humanist and 
determinist dialectical model, and argue that the humanist model is both logically sound and 
normatively closer to what Marx had originally intended. I accept that there is a strong normative 
component to my argument, and that I am biased towards the humanist model. I nevertheless 
endeavour to provide the reader with a fair review of both models. While it is impossible to be 
entirely neutral on the subject, I have endeavoured to spare criticisms of both models in chapters 
three and four until after I have established each in full. This said, let us now turn to the 






Chapter Two: Marx, Marxists, and the Dialectical Method 
I. Outline 
In this chapter I examine the history of the dialectic, as established first by Hegel and then Marx, 
and as it had been used by selected Marxist writers since then. My goal is to establish the ideas 
discussed in more detail in the third and fourth chapters on determinism and humanism, and 
provide the reader with the context of how the dialectic has evolved over the course of the 
history of Marxist ideas. This is by no means a complete study in the subject: many writers have 
been left aside due to time and space constraints. I am confident, however, that the review will 
provide a solid foundation from which the argument I present in this essay may be developed. I 
begin with Hegel, before moving on to Marx. I divide the latter’s work into two periods, the 
young Marx’s writings, and the older Marx’s. I establish this division due to the epistemological 
break that occurred in Marx’s writings around 1844-1845, around the time he was writing the 
Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844. This break was the point at which Marx 
switched from using a humanist dialectical model to the determinist model. This subject is 
discussed a bit further in the text of the present chapter, and also towards the end of chapter four. 
From Marx, I move on to some of the interpreters of Marx’s writing: Lenin, Luxemburg, 
Kautsky, Korsch, Gramsci, and the Soviets. Once this is done, I examine the writings of three 
major figures from the post-Stalin era: Althusser, Poulantzas, and Miliband. Althusser in 
particular is important as he helped lead the attack by the structuralist movement on humanist 
Marxism, while Poulantzas and Miliband stand as an example of a specific debate between two 
Marxists of the opposing camps. Through this, the reader may come to see how the humanist and 
determinist models were defined by Marx, and how they evolved after his death. This said, let us 







Any analysis of Marxist thought must begin with Marx, and any analysis of Marx’s thought must 
start with Hegel, the man upon whose method Marx relied in developing his own theories. While 
I do not intend to present Hegel’s work as a whole, since that is not the topic under discussion, I 
will endeavour here to present a sketch of Hegel’s ideas and his understanding of dialectical 
method.  
Hegel, reared in the 18
th
 century, worked and wrote in the 19
th
 century, and was deeply 
affected by the theories and experiences of the Enlightenment and its culmination in the French 
Revolution.24 As with the thinkers of the 18
th
 Century, Hegel was interested in articulating a 
theory that would explain the totality, or whole, of reality.25 As Heiss argues: “All of Hegel’s 
great works and lectures were built up and expanded according to the dialectical schema, all 
were conceived from the viewpoint of an “Absolute Spirit,” which comes to knowledge of itself 
through its own workings.”26 He was therefore interested in creating a summary of knowledge, 
an awareness of the totality of human thought and the history of ideas.27 However, whereas 
thinkers in the Enlightenment may have believed in finding absolute truths through their work--
that is, that the laws of God’s Creation might be understood, and these laws were permanent and 
unchanging--Hegel used dialectics as a conceptual tool to help comprehend contradictory 
phenomena in the real world, and in the logic and thought of human minds.28 For Hegel, the 
world was the result of a process where Pure Mind or Spirit interacted with its own creation, and 
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became self-aware, through the process of history.29 For Hegel, the world, societies, and people 
changed over time as a result of this interaction between Absolute Mind and humanity. His 
dialectical model would, he believed, resolve the tensions that emerged between individual’s 
freedoms and the rules society created to govern those individuals, and explain how it was that 
human beings come to understand the world.30 On the one hand, then, the Hegelian model 
describes how society evolves as a result of the conflict between subjective reality and objective 
truth, and how human beings themselves conceptualize reality. Since the latter, conceptual 
element of the model helps to explain the former, we turn first to Hegel’s model of human logic 
and cognition. 
With regards to the conceptual model, Hegel’s dialectical model explains how people 
come to understand the world around them. In examining the objects around oneself, one comes 
to differentiate between what an object is, and what it is in essence: for example, calling 
something a body of water, versus defining what ‘a body of water’ actually means.31 By 
qualifying this difference, Hegel demonstrated how the dialectic was a process where the human 
mind uncovered a contradiction between two categories of thought, and transcended them.32 In 
the case of the body of water, there is a difference between the category of a body of water and 
what a body of water actually means: x is a body of water and a body of water is y. These two 
different definitions/understandings and the struggle of the human mind to understand them leads 
to the creation of a synthesis, a new concept of ‘a body of water’ that both incorporates both 
categories of meaning and annuls those meanings at the same time: the new concept is not the 
same as either one of the two categories of meaning individually, but incorporates both into the 
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new definition.33 Basically, then, Hegel’s dialectic was a method by which human beings come 
to understand the objects with which they interact in the real world, and how they come to 
develop new meanings/understanding as they examine those objects. This model was applied by 
Hegel to the individual mind’s internal processes, to society as a whole, and even to the divine 
itself. Objective truth, the Idea as Hegel called it, was the sum of a vast range of particular 
definitions and smaller truths.34 He believed that human beings were capable of achieving a 
subjective and partial understanding of the truth, but not an objective, absolute truth. Hegel was 
concerned with understanding the movement of knowledge: how it arose, how it broke down, 
and the cycle that generated its development over time.35 He sought to develop a system that 
could understand how thinkers, who are inherently limited by their humanity to subjective, 
partial understanding, seek after objective truth, and the societies that arose--and eventually fell--
as a result of the ideas of their time.36 In his argument, the dialectical model was a system where 
a concept came into conflict with its negation, its opposite, and in the interaction a new concept 
emerged.37  
In society, this interaction between parts of the social whole tended to be destructive, and 
through the interaction something new emerged.38 Hegel argued that“consciousness [concrete] 
confronts itself in self-consciousness, and reason as synthesis unites consciousness and self-
consciousness.”39 Put simply, Hegel saw the real world as being the subjective incarnation of 
Spirit. Recognizing that the subjective real world was no longer truly the same as its objective 
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self, Spirit attempts, through history, society, and people, to realize itself objectively in the real 
world. Alienation, for Hegel, was the separation between Spirit and the real world, in that the 
real world, being subjective, is the Spirit but is no longer truly the same as its objective self. The 
subjective understanding of a specific time and place is one particular manifestation of the 
Absolute Mind’s objective knowledge. This subjective understanding is a particular society, 
which comes into conflict with its own negation: an opposing truth or the recognition that the 
subjective reality is not the same as the objective truth. The tension between these two visions of 
truth creates a new society that attempts to redress the failures of the old society.  
Each dialectical relationship would lead to a destruction of thesis and antithesis and the 
creation of some new concept, a synthesis. This process would result from the alienation one 
experienced from the ideas that the people of a time created, a recognition that the ideas either no 
longer fit the times in which one lived, or that they had taken on a life of their own divorced 
from the people who originally created them (becoming a fetish).40 This alienation created the 
negation of the thesis, the opposition within a society, within the thinking of a time, and with 
different levels of meaning in human consciousness, which would lead to transformation: for 
every idea, there would emerge an opposite to that idea. Society and people would face that 
negation head on until it was transcended by a new society and/or a new set of ideas.41  
It would be left to Hegel’s followers and detractors to destroy the basis of his system, 
both the idealist and theological elements of it. His method would remain with Marx and others. 
Marx retained the concepts of alienation (flipping the whole system around so that social 
structures were alienated from people), and would keep elements of the conceptual model of 
Hegel. However, before progressing to Marx, let us summarize three key elements of Hegel’s 
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thought, as they bear on both Marx and Marxists who would follow his methods. 
First, Hegel’s dialectic is neither progressive nor conservative, although his followers and 
detractors used it to suggest he was one or the other. It did explain how progress could occur 
within the history of ideas or in the social order.42 He used the dialectic as a tool to understand 
the process by which ideas and societies changed over time, but did not suggest the process 
would necessarily lead, in each step, to a permanent resolution of the conflict between thesis and 
antithesis. Hegel did believe that there would be an end goal, where Absolute Mind/Spirit 
entered into synthesis with human subjects, but that the process could go be both progressive and 
regressive: there would be many steps taken towards that end goal, but many steps leading away 
from it as well. Many missed his argument that progress is a historical process, an evolution that 
could succeed or fail at any time.43 
Second, and more important, is the fact that Hegel’s dialectic is first and foremost a 
conceptual model. Hegel’s argument describes how it is that human beings come to understand 
the world around them. The process of this understanding was the dialectic in which different 
categories of meanings for a given object are examined, and a deeper definition is determined by 
synthesising the previous categories of meaning into a new category that transcends and annuls 
the previous meaning.44  
Last, Hegel’s concept of alienation has a different meaning than Marx’s. Alienation in 
society is seen as the difference between the subjective knowledge of society/individuals, and the 
objective knowledge the Absolute Mind. Alienation is seen as this divorce between 
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Spirit/Absolute Mind and the real world that is its subjective manifestation.45 Marx would come 
to reject this in favour of a new definition, where human beings come to impart a value to 
objects/ideas that they create that is separate from the objects themselves: money, for example, 
comes to take on a value above and beyond that of a currency to define how much a given 
product is worth. 
Having established Hegel’s theoretical perspective with this brief sketch, let us now turn 
to the focus of our study: Karl Marx and those who followed in his footsteps. 
III. Karl Marx 
Marx struggled to accommodate Hegel’s thought with his own materialist conception of history 
throughout his life.46 Born the son of Jewish parents who had converted to Protestantism, Marx 
was well-educated, and was supported financially by his father throughout his university years.47 
Despite being born to a reasonably financially secure family, Marx struggled with poverty 
throughout his life, losing a daughter and son to starvation and illness in England.48 Thrown out 
of his native Germany, out of France, out of Belgium, Marx was forced to live the life of an 
expatriate in recently-industrialized England. His poverty, his expulsion from countries due to 
his writing in left-leaning papers, his work with the revolutionary movements of 1848, his 
presence in England of the 1800s; all these things contributed to his writing and theory.  
While the older Marx broke somewhat with Hegel, nevertheless he was influenced by 
Hegelian thought due to his instruction in university, and his association with the Young 
Hegelians--particularly, Ludwig Feuerbach and Bruno Bauer. He continued to use the dialectical 
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method of Hegel throughout his life, but rejected Hegel’s position that it was an examination of 
the evolution of ideas/Spirit over time. For the purposes of the present work, I look back on some 
of Marx’s early writings and their interpretation of the dialectic. While there may have been, as 
Tucker and Althusser argue, a break between the early and later Marx, it is my contention that 
elements of Marx’s earlier humanism remained buried within Marx’s later thought. While the 
humanism is not as prominent in his later work, Marx continued to draw on it throughout his life. 
III.A. The Young Marx 
Marx began working on a doctoral thesis on Greek philosophy, which is reasonably unimportant 
except for the glimmers of Marx’s break with Hegelian thought. He had expressed in a letter to 
his father a few years earlier an interest in Hegel’s ideas, even though even then he was uncertain 
about its abstract idealism.49 His doctoral thesis furthered this attack, as Marx took aim at 
‘unphilosophical’ Hegelianism that focussed more on abstract thinking as opposed to an 
examination of the way society worked ‘in the real world.’50 This was the beginning of Marx’s 
rejection of Hegel’s subject of the dialectic: Marx’s dialectic was one in which human beings 
created the objects and ideas around themselves, became alienated from them, and transcended 
that alienation, while Hegel’s was one in which Absolute Spirit/Mind, through history, 
transcended subjective understandings of itself to become objectively realized in the real world. 
Marx acknowledged that the dialectic of Hegel was useful in understanding the development of 
philosophy and thought over the course of human history, however, Marx was already beginning 
to question whether Hegel’s thought applied to the real world. Marx sought to determine what 
Hegel’s dialectic could tell him about the way that societies evolved over time.  
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A brief comment is needed here on the difference between the young and old Marx: 
while I accept the idea that there is an epistemological break in Marx’s writings, I am not 
convinced that it is a clean break, nor that the definitive point of the break can be firmly 
established. This break is Marx’s transition from humanism to determinism in his writing around 
1844. It is this break that makes it necessary for me to classify Marx into the early and later 
Marx: the former’s writing is humanist, the latter’s is determinist. Elements of the humanism of 
his youth remains in his later texts--particularly in the Grundrisse and The German Ideology, but 
elsewhere as well. Thus, the idea of a clean break does not seem right: Marx subjected his theory 
to constant self-examination. That he came, in time, to reject some ideas and kept others should 
come as no surprise. Since I have divided the texts here between the ‘young’ and ‘old’ Marx, 
however, some clarification is necessary. I will, for the sake of argument, accept Althusser’s idea 
that the break occurs roughly around 1844. I would further argue that part of the break resulted 
from the presence of Engels in Marx’s life, whereas before 1844 he and Engels had not become 
collaborators. This is especially relevant considering that Engels acted both as an editor for Marx 
during his life, and that he was responsible for popularizing Marxism. I comment on Engels 
momentarily. It is my position here that an epistemological break does occur within Marx’s 
writing in around 1844-1845: between humanism and determinism. Marx switches from a 
position that accepts human agency as the cause of social changes over time to one that sees the 
economic structure of society as responsible for social changes over time. Even then, the division 
is tentative, and exists simply to establish that Marx, in his youth and earlier writing, put more 
stress on the humanist elements of his thought than the later focus on economics. In many ways, 
both the “German Ideology” and “The Communist Manifesto” are, perhaps, the real beginning of 
                                                                                                                                                                                           






the shift in Marx’s thought--the former is where Marx identifies his work as explicitly breaking 
from Hegel. The latter is an example of a polemical work written jointly by Marx and Engels, at 
which point the lines between the authors blur due to Engel’s involvement. At any rate, the focus 
of the so-called early works remains on the human agent, who was seen as being the cause of 
social change. The later works shift towards an analysis of the economic foundations of society 
and argued that the structure of the economy was responsible for changes in society over time. 
While there is always a blending of both elements throughout Marx, I have used this division in 
Marx’s works to place emphasis on the two conceptions of Marxist theory being studied here: 
the humanist and the determinist. 
Marx took Hegel’s idea of the division between civil society, the family, and the state and 
adapted it to his own thought. Civil society for Marx was, at this point in his development, 
defined as “political” society: it was the social relations one entered into outside the family unit 
based on private property.51 Human beings make religion, the state, and the economic systems in 
which they live.52 These structures, which exist because of the actions and ideas of human 
beings, take on a life outside of the people that create them.53 As with Hegel, Marx viewed civil 
society as a form of alienation, a division between the human being as conscious creator and the 
society he created/inhabited. It was to balance the relationship between the family, that is, the 
personal sphere, and civil society, the relations that existed between different people within the 
society, that the state emerged. And it was in taking part in the state’s existence, in voting, for 
example, that the human being was able to bridge the gap between civil society and political 
society. If one was alienated from oneself as a creator of one’s society, then taking power over 
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that society through the state was the way to reach a synthesis between the opposing forces in the 
relationship of person, family, and society.54 That Marx viewed civil society as being a form of 
political society is likely a result of Hegel’s focus on the state as the balance between an immoral 
realm outside the immediate family and the family as the moral guide for the individual. 
Marx shifts his focus, however, from the political realm and the idea of the state to the 
economy, with the “Theses on Feuerbach,” “On the Jewish Question,” and the Economic and 
Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844. The former emerged as Marx was beginning to leave behind 
the Young Hegelian movement and branch out on his own.55 The latter was an unpublished 
document in which Marx struggled to come to terms with is previous attachment to Hegel’s 
idealism.56  
A brief note on Feuerbach’s arguments will help to illustrate Marx’s thought at this point. 
Feuerbach was one of the various students and disciples of Hegel in Germany who tended 
towards liberal or radical leftist interpretations of Hegel’s writing. Feuerbach rejected some of 
Hegel’s ideas, and in particular, “inverted” Hegel’s ideas.57 Feuerbach argued that, instead of an 
alienation from the ideas which we create, as in Hegel’s thought, and instead of viewing these 
ideas as the dialectical process that history followed, man’s alienation from his own labour and 
from the things that he is able to consciously create leads human beings to seek to reclaim 
themselves in their labour.58 Feuerbach rejected “Hegelian… consciousness in which spirit is 
alienated from itself and striving to transcend its alienation,” arguing it was “nothing but a 
fantasy reflection, a mystical representation of the condition of man in the real world.”59 Instead 
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of arguing that spirit was the alienated consciousness of God or ‘the Idea,’ seeking to transcend 
the conditions of its own alienation through history, Feuerbach argued that human beings had 
created God as the mental incarnation of their own alienated selves. Human beings were no 
longer in control of the things they created (such as God), and thus alienated from a key part of 
themselves. Marx inherited much from Feuerbach: It is from Feuerbach, and others of the Left 
Hegelian movement, that Marx inherited the idea of examining the material conditions in which 
human beings live instead of the spirit or philosophy, and the idea that alienation is a part of the 
way human consciousness understands itself and the world around itself.60  
This conflict over material conditions was the dialectical relationship Marx set out to 
examine. Instead of the Spirit as the subject/agent of history, Marx put human beings in the role 
of agent in the dialectical process.61 Marx argued, for example, that “religion does not make man, 
but man makes religion,” or that human beings make the constitution of a state, the constitution 
does not make them.62 In the “Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right,” Marx criticizes Hegel’s 
argument that the state is the objective agent that determines what human beings are in a given 
society. He follows Feuerbach’s argument that, instead, it is human beings that create the state, 
that it is a social object alienated from themselves. He argues that the “first premise of all human 
history is, of course, the existence of living human individuals.”63 The only reason that human 
society exists in any context is because human beings began to produce their own subsistence.64 
This act of creating our own subsistence creates an imbalance in power in society, between those 
who have ownership over the means of producing such subsistence and those who do not, and 
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therefore the struggle known as class conflict. In time, Marx came to focus on the specific 
structure of the economy, how it evolved over time, and how its internal contradictions defined 
how society evolved. This second model is what I argue defines the determinist model, but more 
on this issue later. For now, it is enough to show the reader the arguments at the heart of his early 
writings, and from there to provide a basic definition of the humanist Marxist dialectical model. 
Let us turn to this now. 
The “Theses on Feuerbach” represents Marx’s rejection of Feuerbach. While he 
maintained some of the ideas Feuerbach ‘lent’ him, he rejected Feuerbach’s teleology--
Feuerbach’s theory never properly explained how it was that human beings were alienated from 
their labour, themselves, and their societies. Feuerbach simply says that it humans were so 
alienated.65 The “Theses” are to the Early Marx what the later “Preface to a Contribution to a 
Critique of Political Economy” are to the later Marx: in many respects, they sum up the ideas 
that Marx would later flesh out in the unpublished Economic Manuscripts. The individual is not 
an abstract concept, Marx argued. Every individual lives in a specific social context, a particular 
society.66 The point, for Marx, is to understand the material condition of human beings and 
society, and then to translate this knowledge into praxis, into action.67 All human beings and 
human activity are part of revolutionary practice, that is, acting in their societies, human beings 
change their societies. Instead of simply providing an understanding of the alienation of 
humanity from its labour, and from itself in society, the point was to see how this alienation and 
humanity’s consciousness of it created change in the system. Thus “the philosophers have only 
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interpreted the world, in various ways; the point is to change it.”68 Human beings act upon their 
societies with every action they take, and it is those actions that drive social change over time. 
Marx’s work “On the Jewish Question” is more than a bit controversial. That Marx was 
Jewish makes his arguments seem more controversial: was it the anti-Semitic rant of a converted 
and self-hating Jew; was it satire; or was it a subtle attempt to attack German capitalism through 
a play on words? While I do not intend to wade too deeply into the debate, the fact that Marx 
was friends with Hess, a Jewish left-Hegelian, and that Judaism meant commerce in the 
colloquialisms of his time, suggests that Marx did not intend to be racist, although perhaps 
politically incorrect. This does not excuse the metaphor, by any means. Marx argued that what 
held the Jews back from emancipation was their attachment to the idol of money, and that money 
had become the god that man had created in his alienation from his own labour.69 As long as this 
subordination to money existed, neither Jew nor Christian could ever truly be free. One can 
argue that the whole text was an extended metaphor for the effect of capitalism on both 
bourgeoisie and proletariat, but due to the controversial nature of the metaphor, I shall leave the 
text behind with only one further comment. It is here, and in the other early writings, that Marx’s 
humanism and socialism emerges: so long as all human beings continued to be alienated from 
themselves due to commerce, money, and the division of labour, no human being could truly be 
free until all were free of that alienation. Marx argues that by creating a god out of money that 
human beings have created a social structure over which they no longer have any control. To be 
free requires human beings to understand that they have created money as a new god, and to 
reject it, among other things. It is here that Marx’s concept of alienation emerges. He defines 
alienation as when human beings come to associate value with an object they have created, 
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above and beyond what it actually is: money, for example, is no longer just currency, it becomes 
something of worth in and of itself, and is almost worshipped as a form of god. I shall, of course, 
discuss alienation in greater depth in chapter four, but for now, this shall suffice as a working 
definition. 
The Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844 are more in depth, and remained 
unpublished until after Marx’s death. It is in the Manuscripts that Marx, along with Engels, 
begins to challenge the idealism of Hegel’s thought. In particular, Marx was trying to determine 
how it was that the economy affected other aspects of society.70 Marx presupposes the idea of the 
division of labour and other liberal economic ideas (labour theory of value, for instance). For 
Marx, the more one worked, the more one was stuck within a certain division of labour that 
divorces the labourer from the things that labourer creates.71 Instead of owning the object that the 
agent creates, the object of one’s labour becomes a separate thing from the agent. This object 
takes on a life and a value of its own, above and beyond what its creator gave to it. This is 
alienation. The division of mental and manual labour is a further division of humanity from what 
Marx defines as humanity’s ‘species-being.’ At the risk of enraging Marx’s ghost, this species-
being is, in a way, his definition of human nature: human beings are defined as different from the 
majority of animals in that our actions are conscious, and in that we create the means of our own 
subsistence.72 We can, as opposed to other animals, conceptualize the actions we take. Labour, 
particularly but not exclusively in capitalism, divides human beings from this human nature, in 
that humans are forced by the division of labour within society to work for survival, as opposed 
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to a free, self-conscious activity.73 In addition, however, human beings act to create the society in 
which they live: the manner in which they act to resolve the various needs they have--food, 
shelter, procreation, and so forth--create social structures like the state, the economy, gender, the 
family, and so forth. Not all of these social structures are created consciously: the choice to grow 
wheat as opposed to rice may be due to the farmer’s understanding that he will have more 
success with wheat in his area of the world, as opposed to the desire to create an agricultural 
economy based on wheat production. In making that choice, however, the worker both A) is able 
to consciously plan out his own actions with regards to whether or not it will be successful, how 
he will implement the grain growing on his farm, and so forth, and B) takes an action that helps 
shape the society around him. 
This is particularly true in the case of the factory worker, whose work is anything but 
mental. The factory worker may be able to conceptualize the product that the factory will 
produce, but his or her job is simply to push a button. The factory worker may help build the 
product, but he or she does not own that product. This alienation from the thing that one creates 
is present in all societies, so long as private property exists.74 And since the factory worker takes 
part in a form of social contract with his employer, he creates a social structure and helps shape 
the structure of society itself into a wage-labour economy. Even Communism, whatever form it 
may take, will not be truly free from alienation until private property and the division of labour 
no longer divide human beings from the things that they make with their own hands.75 Private 
property divides human beings from each other, separating ownership into those who have and 
those who do not. In Marx’s ideal world, labour and property would be collectively owned, to 
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allow the labour of all to be owned by all.76 So long as a human being owes her existence to 
another human being, that person is neither free nor fully human.77 Whether this would resolve 
the conflict of alienation is, frankly, debatable--it is possible that even collective ownership 
would still separate a human being from the object he or she creates in some way.  
More importantly, Marx argues that it is through a dialectical model that cognition can be 
understood.78 When we study a thing, we not only study the thing, but the concept of that thing.79 
We understand the object as being separate from the self, and can recognize ourselves as being 
both a subject and object: we are subjects in that we are able to examine the world around 
ourselves, and objects in that other subjects can study us as well.80 Marx argued that this 
understanding of the self as subject and object was self-consciousness.81 This cognitive process 
also explains the humanist concept of social evolution. Society is a series of structures that are 
built as human beings develop ways of resolving their various needs. The need for food results in 
a production system designed to resolve that need, while the need for order results in the state. 
Humans endow these social structures with a value and power outside of what they are in our 
own minds. Whereas the state exists as a result of human actions that create rules for society, it 
comes to be seen as having a value and power in and of itself, even though human beings had 
created it. Humanist Marxism is an attempt by Marx, and others, to conceptualize alienation, and 
how alienation occurs in society and social structures. Furthermore, the humanist conception of 
Marxism allows the thinker to understand how various societies have changed over time as 
human beings attempt to resolve their needs and the conflicts caused by alienation of the self and 
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of the social whole.  
With this in mind, we can at last define the humanist dialectic as the young Marx saw it. 
In this version of the dialectic, it is humanity that creates society and the structure of the 
economy, not the other way around. There are two aspects to the dialectical process for the 
young Marx. The first is the conceptual process we have already described, in which the subject 
(human) interacts with the object (whatever he/she observes) and assigns to the objects being 
studied a value that is later perceived to be intrinsic to the object in and of itself beyond the 
object’s original definition and/or use (alienation). This dialectical model helped Marx to 
describe how human beings come to understand the world around them, and to be changed by 
their experiences of that world. The other aspect of the dialectical model examines society. 
Unlike Marx’s later, more economic model, for the younger Marx, the dialectical process as it 
applied to society had to do with the way human beings shaped society. In this, the human being 
enters into society as a conscious, creative being (remembering Marx’s idea of species-being).82 
Human beings have given needs. To resolve those needs, people create methods by which they 
can resolve those needs--these methods become social structures through the process of 
alienation: what once were simple methods of production eventually come to be seen as 
structures over which human beings have little to no control and which are imbued with a power 
that they would not otherwise have. The various methods of production create a division of 
labour, as each individual takes on certain tasks. We are assigned certain roles in the division of 
labour created by the methods of production of that society: in capitalism, for example, one is 
made into a labourer, or a manager, or what-have-you. The division of labour in capitalism is but 
one manner in which human beings can resolve their needs in society. But the result is a human 
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being who is less than what Marx’s ideal human being is: in capitalism, the labourer is a 
machine, not a human being, and is alienated from himself.83  
The conceptual model Marx developed helps to explain the change in the social model of 
the dialectic. Human beings can naturally see things as objects, and identify themselves as 
subjects. But for Marx, this process was dialectical, that is, in so doing, the human being is aware 
of the difference between herself and the object.84 And since we are also able to understand 
ourselves as objects, we are able to identify ourselves as alienated beings.85 Once we come to 
understand this alienation, we can struggle to change both the alienated objects and the social 
systems we have created and that are now divorced from us. One can annul alienation through 
action that is conscious of the causes of that alienation.86 Marx would spend the rest of his life 
trying to determine how this process would occur, specifically in the rejection of capitalism. 
Marx’s later works are founded on this basic humanism. The heart of the problem with 
capitalism is an alienated human being, struggling to understand his own alienation and to 
overcome it. Something that should be remembered, however, is Marx’s concern about Hegel: 
the dialectical model is an abstraction of what is. The real world is made up of real objects, but 
our understanding, our conceptual model, is dialectical.87 Marx may have lost sight of this at 
times, but later Marxists, including his friend Engels, took the dialectical model and applied it to 
everything, assuming that the world itself operated by the laws uncovered by their own theories. 
For the young Marx, and even in some of the writing of the later Marx, this was seen as a fallacy. 
It was through the use of a dialectical model that one could understand oneself, and the society in 
which one lived. This knowledge allowed one to act more effectively in society to change the 
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social structures around oneself: by being aware of the way that they have been formed. The 
resulting effects could be measured through the dialectic. But the action of praxis would also 
create changes in the system one measured, and in the self. The dialectic of the humanist Marx 
was ever-changing, ever in flux. While there was a kernel of stability present in Marx’s concept 
of the human animal as a conscious creator, his idea of human beings suggests that we are 
constantly in flux because our understanding of ourselves and our equally unstable social world, 
is always changing.  
I comment further on this version of Marxist dialectics in the fourth chapter. There, I 
provide more depth to the concept of alienation, to the humanist dialectic and human agency, to 
the epistemological break, and to the difference between Feuerbachian and humanist Marxism. 
For now, let us turn to the later Marx, and thence to Engels and those who followed in both 
men’s footsteps, in order to see how the dialectic evolved from its humanist roots into something 
entirely different. 
III.B The Later Marx 
After 1844, Marx began to examine in more depth the economic basis of capitalism: what it was, 
how it was formed, and where it was likely to go. Part of the reason for the shift was 
undoubtedly the continual expulsions he faced from various countries. It is easy to write a theory 
that suggests capitalism may be short-lived, but the concern for Marx rapidly became 
determining how it would fall. That Marx was continually removed from his place of residence, 
and forced to live in England under the deepest poverty, undoubtedly had an impact on his ideas. 
Another part of the transition may have been the presence of Friedrich Engels. I do not wish to 
suggest that Engels attempted to sabotage or deliberately misrepresent Marxism, but it is quite 
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likely that Engel’s editing and later work created a different translation of Marx’s ideas than 
perhaps Marx himself might have envisioned.88  
At any rate, as Marx aged, and took part  in the various workers’ movements of his time, 
he continued to write and attempt to formulate a theory of the transition from capitalism to 
socialism. Where his early theories seem to focus more on the relationship of the human being to 
his social environment, the later theories focus far more on the structure of that social 
environment. While elements of his earlier humanism remain, the shift towards ‘scientific 
socialism,’ that which I here call determinism, had begun. 
The shift had begun in some respects as early as The Holy Family, but the real ‘coming 
out’ of the new vision of socialism was, of course, The Communist Manifesto. The Holy Family 
takes aim at Proudhon and political economy, both of which Marx accuses as taking private 
property as a given.89 The idea of alienation continued to be of importance to Marx,90 as the rage 
that it engendered in the proletariat would act like a goad to the workers as part of the freedom of 
all of humanity--since the proletariat were directly exploited in this economic system, and since 
the system itself was based on economic exploitation, the only way the system could resolve its 
own contradictions was the eradication of all economic exploitation.91 Again, we can see the 
break with Feuerbach and Hegel, here: “ideas can never lead beyond an old-world system but 
only beyond the ideas of the old-world system.”92 Whereas Feuerbach and Hegel may have 
believed that the act of realizing the existence of alienating leads to change in and of itself, for 
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Marx, that realization was only the first step. 
The second step was the transformation of the material conditions in which humanity 
lived and worked. The Manifesto and the “Preface to a Contribution to the Critique of Political 
Economy” summarize this new focus quite well. Marx’s youthful concern with the way the 
human mind dealt with the world around him, with alienation and its impact, is now blended into 
an economic analysis of capitalism and all societies. “All history is that of class struggle,” all 
societies have class and class struggle, and understanding this can lead to an understanding of 
how societies change.93 Marx’s argument in the Manifesto was no longer that the human being in 
society necessarily transformed the society, it was that the society would be changed by 
economic necessity. The bourgeoisie’s exploitation of the proletariat creates the seeds of the 
system’s own destruction, as the capitalists use the workers as part of the industrial process that 
dehumanizes those workers.94 Their training in the workplace gives the proletariat the knowledge 
they need to gain ownership over the products they manufacture--in some ways resolving the 
alienation Marx first affirmed in his youth. So far, Marx appears to maintain a humanist 
perspective. 
And yet, it is the material conditions of society that conditions the consciousness of the 
men (and one presumes, women) living in that society, Marx wrote in the “Preface.”95 The 
material conditions of society, Marx thought, were the arrangements by which society provided 
for the basic needs of all human beings. How a society divides the labour that is necessary to 
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provide for these needs determines the structure of the society itself.96 It is no longer the 
conscious creator that Marx envisions as the determinant of human existence, it is the social 
structure that creates the human being. Upon the economic base of society rests a social, 
political, and ideological superstructure, in which the members of the society engage in conflict 
over the control of the base.97 “At a certain stage of their development,” Marx writes, “the 
material productive forces of society come in conflict with the existing relations of production, 
or--what is but a legal expression for the same thing--with the property relations within which 
they have been at work hitherto.”98 The very structure of the society, the manner in which society 
resolves the needs of its members, comes into conflict with the property relations that this 
division of labour creates, and the ensuing conflict leads to a revolutionary transformation of the 
society. A new base emerges, and a new superstructure rests atop the new order. Gone is the 
creative human being from the centre of Marx’s theory, although she makes her return at the end 
of history in communism, where each human being is a creative individual, an artist in the 
morning and a labourer at night.99 Replacing her is the social structure based on the economy. 
Humanism is replaced with economic determinism. 
Marx is not so vulgar about this determinism as some of his followers. He retains the 
sense that it is the human beings within society who must resolve the tensions engendered by the 
clash of the division of labour with the ownership of the economy. But the human labourer is no 
longer the agent of history, he is swept up in the machinery and production system within which 
he lives.100 Marx tried to balance his analysis of the economic base of a social structure, the form 
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which it takes, and the human individuals who act within that system. But his later works still put 
forward a deterministic view of human social existence. 
In the Grundrisse, written before Capital, it is the act of production that starts the process 
of creating commodities, for without production there is no commodity.101 And the production of 
a commodity is a dialectical process, for the production process not only creates the commodity, 
but the very act of creating a product in a society based on the division of labour creates the 
proletariat as such.102 Whereas in previous societies, workers used tools, the creation of the 
machinery of modern society transforms a creative, individual action of production into a new 
form--modern capitalism and industrial labour.103 The alienation that results is that of a human 
being that has, instead of being the conscious creator that Marx envisioned in his youth, become 
a cog in a vast productive machine. Tool-based labour in previous societies resulted in human 
beings who were conscious creators of the products they made with their own hands. Machinery, 
Marx argued, was explicitly designed so that it would produce something for another human 
being’s ownership: the capitalist owned the whole process of labour.104 Instead of being a 
conscious creator who must simply part with his own product, the proletariat is divorced from his 
role as a conscious creator to begin with in capitalism. 
In Capital, his final major work, Marx continues to retain the concept of alienation, 
adapting it to the commodities that he studies. It is a thing external to us that satisfies our 
wants.105 But the commodity is the basis of the system of capitalism, a thing that has an value in 
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exchange for other commodities.106 Capital itself takes on a life of its own, outside of the people 
who create it.107 To sustain capital, value must be infused into commodities, and it is labour that 
creates this value.108 I will refrain from an in-depth discussion of the concept of surplus labour 
value here, except to provide a basic sense of Marx’s economic theory. Essentially, Marx argued 
that the only way for capitalism to derive a profit from labour was surplus labour, that is, labour 
above and beyond the basic requirement to produce enough commodities to balance out the cost 
of production (machinery, labour, and so forth). The latter would only balance things out, but the 
capitalist would soon find him or herself out of business as others profited. The means of profit 
came from extracting more work from the labourer than he was paid for. One can argue the 
validity of this model outside industrial labour, and outside capitalism, of course, but it remains a 
basic point: if one does not make more money than one puts in to the production of a 
commodity, one will not long survive as a capitalist!109 Marx argued that production would reach 
a point where labour was no longer able to provide enough value to handle the rising costs of 
production and that capitalism would no longer be able to make profit (the tendency of the rate 
of profit to fall). The result of this tendency was a series of economic crises, at which point the 
system itself might be changed via a revolution of sorts.110 
Again, the shift towards economic determinism is present, here. While the labourer may 
be alienated from the work he puts into capitalist industry, while capital itself may be alienated 
from the people who created it in the first place, the capitalist is the system personified.111 He 
functions according to the dictates of the role he is made to play by the system in which he lives, 
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not independently of the laws of capitalism. The proletariat’s wages, the price of their labour, has 
nothing to do with labour as an agent in production, it is instead a function of the surplus value 
that must be created in order for capitalism to survive.112 Revolutions do not occur at the behest 
of the proletariat, they happen as a result of the mechanism of capitalism, its tendency to lose 
wealth without constant expansion.113  
And yet, there was always tension in Marx’s writing between the economic system that 
‘determined’ human consciousness within that system, and the human as a conscious producer of 
her own existence. Capital’s productive agent exists within that economic system, alienated from 
his labour and from his own productive power due to the division of labour: one’s labour has no 
value in capitalism except as a product,114 and the proletarian, instead of producing her needs for 
herself, instead must sell her labour on the market in order to survive. Instead of the individual 
producer as the agent of history, Marx argues that value and the system are socially created.115  
This tension between the economic determinism found in the “Preface,” in Capital, and 
in other later works by Marx, and the humanism of the earlier dialectical model, continued 
throughout all of Marx’s life. Marx’s economic analysis provides a framework that allows for 
social analysis, and yet it reduces the process of social change to shifts in the economic form of 
society. Marx’s humanist arguments lack the depth of his later works--primarily because he 
shifted towards a more economic point of view-- but implied that even in a social structure, the 
way that societies changed depended on the action of the members of that society: how they 
resolved the alienation created by the social structure was the determinant factor, not the social 
structure. 
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One potential criticism of the summary thus far would be the argument that there was no 
epistemological break, that Marx continued to use the idea of alienation, perhaps implicitly, 
throughout his entire life and that his humanist arguments were present in his later works. 
Certainly, the presence of the concept of alienation in the Grundrisse might confirm this, and the 
“Preface” uses similar ideas. And yet, there is the break, explicitly stated by Marx himself in the 
Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts in 1844, and in the Preface in 1858-9. If Marx himself 
did not think there was such a break, why mention it?  
To give the problem its due requires me to overcome two different issues with regards to 
the later Marx: first, whether or not the humanist element was present, and second, if it was 
present, why am I arguing there is a difference between the young and old Marx? Was the 
humanist element no longer dominant, perhaps? Certainly, some of Marx’s later work includes 
elements of humanism. I have already discussed them above, and will spare the reader too much 
rehearsal of my summary, but the Grundrisse, Capital, the Preface, and the “German Ideology” 
all have elements of humanism in them. Certainly, Marx did not completely abandon his earlier 
work.  
First, the difference between the young and old Marx is striking. In the Manuscripts, the 
“Theses on Feuerbach,” and his youthful writings, the emphasis is on the human agent. The 
dialectical model of the young Marx is a conceptual model that describes how the human being 
interacts with his world, and how that interaction shapes his society. The later Marx’s model is 
how society shapes the human being. Now, this may be something of a chicken-and-egg 
problem, since the dialectical model does not just leave the human being in isolation. By shaping 
his society, the human changes his own world and thus himself. And yet the human being is still 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
115






the agent, for she can change the world again by her actions. The determinist model sees human 
beings as the embodiments of social forces.116 The capitalist personifies the capitalist system, 
while the proletariat embodies the antithesis of the capitalist. The emphasis is on the elements of 
the dialectical system--human beings-- as elements of a system, or a structure, and changes in the 
structure create new types of people. Gone is the emphasis on the human being as conscious 
creator of that structure. If the human being as conscious creator is present in the later Marx, she 
has been badly short-changed. 
Secondly, if humanism is still present in the later Marx, it is in a very different form. At 
times, Marx seems conscious of this problem, for why would a determinist model need any one 
element of the system to lead a revolution, or any form of change for that matter? The message 
of the Communist Manifesto, delivered as a call to arms to the workers of Belgium, would surely 
not have been necessary. There is, then, something of a paradox within Marx’s writings, a 
tension that continues in most later Marxist writing: if the dialectical model is deterministic, then 
there is nothing to be done except wait for the inevitable change. And yet, there is the need for 
agency to push the transition along. But Marx’s later model, and the determinist Marxism that 
follows the line of reasoning of the later writings, assumes that a system’s own internal 
contradictions would lead to its dissolution, and the creation of a new social order. This, then, is 
the epistemological break within Marx’s writing: his transition from a humanist model to the 
determinist model. This break is crucial, as the two models are entirely incompatible: either 
human agents cause changes in society, or the internal contradictions inherent in a structure 
cause those changes. I will comment further on the determinist model in chapter three, but for 
now, let us continue our review. 
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IV. Interpreters  
Marxists who followed Marx would contend with this dichotomy in their own way. Marx 
himself appears to have tried to balance the tension between the two models of the dialectic--
humanism intrudes in the determinist later model, to some extent, and the early model is not 
completely mindless of the effect of society on the human agent within that society. However, 
the transition to a deterministic model was helped along in many ways by the writing of 
Friedrich Engels and later writers, to whom we turn now. 
IV.A. Friedrich Engels 
Engels’ version of the dialectic was, of course, influenced by his proximity to Marx. Engels had 
a great impact on Marx as both his friend and collaborator, and especially as an editor of his 
work. Engels had read Hegel as had Marx, but where the young Marx applied Hegelian dialectics 
as Hegel intended (a conceptual model), Engels began to see the dialectic as an ontology (‘that 
which is‘). Where Marx asked ‘how do we understand the real world?’ and answered with a 
dialectical model, Engels sought to answer the question “what is the real world?”117 The fact that 
Engels came, in time, to defend Marx’s arguments against Mikhail Bakunin and others,118 put 
him in the interesting position of creating what was considered orthodox Marxism after Marx 
died.  
Engels argued that the basis for all social change was to be found in the mode of production and 
changes in it.119 The dialectic of Hegel, Engels argued, and that of Marx sought to examine 
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changes in society over the course of history.120 Engels believed his dialectical model was 
accurate: science had, in his mind, shown that the basis for dialectics was that organisms shed 
and gained atoms from their environment, and that all reality was reducible to atoms moving 
against one another in a “dialectical” fashion.121 The scientific model of socialism saw history as 
a process of human evolution, and analyzed the conflict between classes in the economy which 
would drive social change.122 The proletariat and the capitalist played their roles within this 
dialectical process in the current epoch, and the economic base of society was, in his famous 
words, “in the final element” the determining factor of social change.123 The very first division of 
labour in human society was that caused by child bearing and rearing.124 This division leads to 
the creation of the patriarchal family, and thus to the “first form of slavery:” that of husband and 
wife.125 This first division of labour is one of the first principles upon which the division of 
people into classes occurs, Engels argued. 
That there is a change from Marx to Engels should be readily apparent, but this requires a 
hammer-blow to drive the point home: Marx, especially in his youth, but also to a certain degree 
in his later years, established that his dialectical model was conceptual: it was a tool to examine 
the world and how human beings might understand it, particularly the society in which one lived. 
However, Engels argued for an ontological dialectical model, one that explained the way the 
world actually worked. To Engels, history, society, and economics followed the laws established 
by the dialectical model.126   
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IV.B. Karl Kautsky 
Kautsky wrote in Germany towards the end of the 19
th
 Century, and continued writing in exile 
during the Nazi period all the way until the end of the 1930s during the rise of Stalin in Russia.127 
Like Marx, Kautsky argues that it is the economic structure, the manner in which society handles 
the production necessary to deal with basic needs (food, shelter, sex, etc.), that determines 
society’s organization as a whole.128 Kautsky argued that the demand for commodities that 
resolve these and other needs--and eventually, wants-- required “a form of production which 
could and would adapt itself to the demand; in other words, a form absolutely in command of the 
merchants.”129 Again, it is not the human agent who creates the social order, it is the social order 
that creates the people within it: the labourer’s work defines him as member of the proletariat.130 
And since the proletariat play the role of opposition to the capitalists, the dominant class, only 
they can oppose the capitalists and defeat them.131 The only way to end any of the exploitation 
that occurs within capitalism is to abolish the system itself.132 Human agents within the system 
play the role that society puts them in; unlike in the humanist Marxist approach, it is not 
conscious agents that create the social world in which they live, it is economics. But the social 
relations of power, Kautsky argues, transform productive processes and vice versa.133 Thus, the 
political and ideological ‘superstructure’ of a society does have an impact on the economic base. 
This allows Kautsky to argue that human action is necessary to change society in his defense of 
                                                           
127
      Hook, Sydney, introduction to Social Democracy vs. Communism, by Karl Kautsky, edited and translated by 
David Shub and Joseph Shaplen (Westport: Hyperion Press, 1990), 7. 
128
      Kaustsky, Karl, The Class Struggle (Erfurt Program), translated by William E. Bohn, (New York: WW 
Norton & Company, 1971), 9-10. 
129
      Ibid., 15. 
130
      Ibid., 19-20. 
131
      Ibid., 159. 
132
      Ibid., 24. 
133







democratic reform as opposed to Lenin’s and Rosa Luxemburg’s support for revolutionary 
activity. However, the division of labour, the way in which labourers are divided into various 
social tasks to produce commodities and goods, occurs without conscious or unconscious agency 
on the part of the labourers.134 
At times, Kautsky implies that it is human beings who determine the course of the 
process of history. Kautsky argued that the workers were required to change the system, 
something that implies that they have a role to play as more than simply the embodiment of 
social forces. Towards the end of his life, his perspective appears to have become much more 
closely aligned to humanism. Kautsky argues in Social Democracy versus Communism that 
Marx and Engels wanted to determine the way that economic society evolves,135 but he also 
points out that Marxism as an argument is an interpretation of how human beings understand the 
world.136 Lenin and Stalin’s Marxism, Kautsky believes, is based on a determinism that “would 
mean making the emancipation of the workers dependent upon historical accidents,” since the 
only way that change in the social order occurs in the economic determinist account of Marxism 
is when the proletariat rebels against capitalism in times of crisis.137 It is Kautsky’s argument that 
this takes away from the workers, and from Marxism, denying both the usefulness of democratic 
reform and the possibility of useful action on the part of the workers outside of crises.  
IV.C. Karl Korsch 
Korsch, like Kautsky, was forced to flee Germany during the rise of the Nazi party to power. 
Korsch ended up in America, where he continued to write until his death.138 He was concerned, 
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like Kautsky, by the growing dogmatism and intolerance of the Soviets, and wrote Marxism and 
Philosophy as an attack on the Soviet Union’s theory and practice.139 Korsch argued that the 2
nd
 
Soviet International, having abandoned any discussion of Hegelian philosophy and dialectics, 
was therefore incapable of understanding the position of Marxism itself.140 Since Hegel’s 
dialectical model was the basis of Marx’s position, understanding Hegel and earlier philosophy 
was the key to understanding Marx.141 Hegel’s argument was an expression of the revolutionary 
activity of the bourgeoisie when they first arose and took power in society from the nobility.142 
But the bourgeoisie, having power, no longer accepted revolutionary practice, and could 
therefore no longer understand dialectics, that is, the theory of transition and revolution.143 Since 
dialectics was, in Korsch’s argument, the relationship of a given thought or perspective and 
actions that resulted from it vs. a set of thoughts/perspectives and actions in contrast to it, the 
position of Marxism could only be understood as the position of the proletariat in opposition to 
Hegel and the bourgeoisie.144 The bourgeoisie could not allow themselves to go any further 
philosophically than liberalism, and in practice no further than capitalism, for to do so would be 
to negate their own existence.145 Marxism, and the movement of the proletariat, could move 
further as it represented something dialectically opposed to the  current, bourgeois and capitalist, 
position.   
The dialectical model for Korsch was, in some respects, humanist: it was an attempt to 
understand how it was that human beings saw the world around them at a given moment in time, 
and how they could act to change it in that moment in time. And yet, Korsch is essentially 
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arguing that one can only understand a position within the dialectical system if one occupies that 
position, that is, if it is the way that one understands the actions one takes in a given social 
system. If ever that system is transformed into something new, a new position must be taken up 
to explain the changes.   
IV.D. Rosa Luxemburg 
Rosa Luxemburg, like Lenin, believed firmly in the need for revolutionary activity. In some 
ways, however, she appears to lean further towards determinism than Kautsky. Luxemburg was, 
from the beginning, at odds with the establishment within the Social Democratic Party, 
particularly with Bernstein (a reformist) but also with Kautsky.146 Reform or Revolution was 
written during Luxemburg’s first few years in Germany, as an attack on Bernstein.147 The book is 
interesting for the purposes of this paper in that it briefly touches on the ideas of agency and 
dialectics. She accused Bernstein of breaking with Marxism and with Marxism’s ‘scientific’ 
socialism.148 Bernstein, she argued, was incorrect in asserting that capitalism’s adaptability meant 
that no real crisis would ever occur--since crises were, in the orthodoxy of Marxism at the time, 
the key moments when a revolution might occur--and as a result, his position that socialism 
should concentrate on slower, reform-based moves and work within capitalism to make the 
system better for the poor and working classes struck her as being non-Marxist.149 Instead, 
Luxemburg argued that scientific socialist theory believed that it was through these crises and 
revolutionary activity that the transition to socialism would occur.150 The social organization of 
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capitalism, and the way it would be transcended, was “dialectical,”151 in that the capitalist system 
and its parts, as an organic whole, could not survive the loss of its parts and remain capitalism.152 
Thus Bernstein’s reforms could only mitigate conflicts within capitalism, not resolve them. 
Luxemburg displays a distinct tendency towards determinism here, in that these ‘crises’ of 
capitalism, not necessarily the actions of the workers themselves, would bring about the 
revolution. Certainly, the workers would have to act on these crises, taking advantage of them to 
change the social structure.153 The workers would need to act on these crises. Yet, if the workers 
are seen as agents, it should not matter whether there is a crisis in capitalism for their actions to 
have an effect on the society in which they live. Instead, it is the social structure, the 
contradictions within capitalism, that determines when crises emerge, and thus when change can 
occur in society according to Luxemburg’s argument.  
IV.E. Vladimir Ilyich Lenin 
Lenin’s writing is often polemical, and is usually an attack on some socialist or anarchist writer 
or another for what Lenin perceived to be their--sometimes numerous--errors. Lenin at times 
embraces humanism in his calls for activism on the part of both workers and a political party, but 
at times shows a tendency towards determinism. Lenin wrote What is to be Done in part as an 
attack on ‘economism,’ which he saw as a tendency to see the transition to socialism as 
inevitable.154 This sort of language makes classifying Lenin a humanist or determinist difficult. 
He wrote against economism throughout his career, and yet at the same time that he argues 
against economism and ‘spontaneity,’ or the idea of a revolution that would spontaneously occur 
at times of crises--Luxemburg’s position--Lenin also argued that the revolutionary movement 
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must call for action at times of outrage and crisis.155 He argued that revolutionary leadership, the 
vanguard of the proletariat, would ensure that the movement did not act prematurely when the 
time was not right for a revolution.156 Yet what determines the timing? On the one hand, the party 
serves as a humanist Marxist might see it. It acts as a conscious, albeit collective, agent made up 
of individual human beings, and has a role in creating the social structure around it. But, on the 
other hand, Lenin believed that there were “dialectically correct solutions” to “objective 
contradictions.157 Lenin argued that it is the productive systems that lie at the base of society that 
lead to “comprehensive socialization of production,” or the form the rest of society takes, not the 
actions of human agents.158 The economic system, the way in which material needs are resolved, 
determines the structure of the society. The creation of organizations on the scale of the modern 
state and the modern corporation inherently socializes production because of the ownership of all 
productive processes by the few, creating the conditions necessary for the rise of the proletariat 
in opposition.159 
Furthermore, Lenin also argued that the economic role of the proletariat was what allows 
them to lead the class struggle.160 The workers, being subjected to direct economic oppression, 
will, when they are in power, refuse to allow any power relations to dominate them.161 Yet it is 
not the agency--the choice-- of the workers that gives them this role, it is the economic 
conditions they face due to their being oppressed in a dialectical system. Only a change in the 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
154
      Lenin, V.I, What is to be Done? (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1963), 25-6. 
155
      Ibid., 69-70. 
156
      Ibid., 127. 
157
      Lukacs, Georg, Lenin, the Unity of his Thought, (London: New Left Books, 1970), 87.  
158
      Lenin, V.I., Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism, (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1969), 25. 
159
      Ibid., 154-5. 
160
      Ibid., 23. 
161






economic system will allow equality.162 However, if the economic system is seen as determining 
the structure of society, then there is no place for human agency in such a system. Human agency 
simply does not matter. Lenin, like many Marxists, is caught between both humanism and 
determinism, bouncing back and forth between both at various points in his career depending on 
to whom he wrote and when he did so. Due to the impact of the Soviet Union Lenin created, it 
will help to turn to them next, and see the results of Lenin’s labour. 
IV. F. Soviet “Diamat” 
The Soviet Union’s dialectical model is often difficult to determine since Stalin and the 
Communist Party tended to change their definition of Communism and Marxism to fit the needs 
of any given time. J.M. Bochenski wrote a small text called Soviet Russian Dialectical 
Materialism (Diamat) in the 1960s, as an attempt to explain the Soviet point of view. He argues, 
interestingly, that it was Engels who perfected Marx’s position.163  Soviet Dialectical 
Materialism, Bochenski argues, emerges from Marx’s concept that it is the economic structure of 
society that determines the social structure and the consciousness of its members.164 He 
considered Engels’ “more scientific” model to be the real basis for Marxism, and more 
accurate.165 The dialectical model of the Soviets, Bochenski argues, is based on Lenin and Engels 
in that it accepts their view of the dialectic as being ontological or a model that explains the real 
world as it is, as opposed to epistemological, describing how it is that human beings perceive the 
real world. One’s role in the social order is determined by one’s relationship to other parts of the 
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social whole: if one is proletarian, it is because there is a bourgeois element in society.166 On the 
whole, Bochenski would have one believe that Marxist thought in the Soviet Union was based on 
a dialectical model that establishes general rules for how the world works. It is both ontological, 
and deterministic, in that it is the material conditions of society that determine everything within 
the structure of society. 
IV. G. Antonio Gramsci 
Antonio Gramsci worked with the Italian Communist party in the 1910s and 1920s. He began to 
run into difficulties with the rise of Mussolini in the 1920s, when he tried to form alliances with 
both workers and other political parties against the fascists.167 He would later die in prison. 
During his incarceration he wrote The Prison Notebooks, from which I draw a small piece in the 
present essay.168 Something that stands out almost immediately is Gramsci’s idea that all human 
beings are “philosophers,” helping to define the ideas around them, and that they therefore play 
an active role in the world around them.169 Gramsci in general rejected “mechanistic” 
(deterministic) views of Marxism, saying that the faith in the inevitable failure of capitalism had 
more to do with European Christian ideas than political philosophy.170 Marxism rose above 
concepts of universalism such as in Christianity, by trying to connect people in their contexts to 
the reality of the social organizations in which they lived as opposed to universal truth.171 
Gramsci did not believe there was “one rule and no other for thinking and functioning that 
                                                           
166
      Ibid., 91. 
167
      Dr. Marks, Louis, introduction to The Modern Prince by Antonio Gramsci, translated by Dr. Louis Marks, 
(New York: International Publishers, 1957/1968),13-17. 
168
     In particular, I review here “What is Man?” “The Modern Prince,” and “The Study of Philosphy and of 
Historical Materialism.” 
169
     Gramsci, Antonio, “The Study of Philosophy and of Historical Materialism,” in The Modern Prince by 
Antonio Gramsci, translated by Dr. Louis Marks (New York: International Publishers, 1957/1968) 58. 
170






applies equally to all men.”172 Since, for example, the authoritarian regime in place in Russia 
could fall to a revolution, revolutionary doctrine made sense for Lenin’s work in Russia. 
However, the more advanced countries of Western Europe had deep support for their own 
capitalist regimes. This support had to be attacked where it was strongest: civil society. To do 
this, Marxism in the West, he argued, would have to cut away the support for capitalism by 
appealing to the masses.173 Each member of society, in their given role, played a part in the 
dialectical relationship: the intellectuals helped support the superstructure of capitalism (the 
ideologies and political structure that maintained it), which required a counterpart in the 
proletariat: the party.  
In Gramsci there is a mix of the determinism of the Soviets and the later Marx, and the 
humanism of the early Marx: the roles which one plays in society are determined by the social 
structure and the economy as part of the context of the society,174 while the party had to educate 
the masses to play their part and take the lead in the struggle against capitalism. To lead the 
response of the proletariat against their oppressors, Gramsci argued for a Modern Prince, the 
political party, that would build a coalition of supporters which would stand against capitalist 
power in democratic societies and begin to involve the masses in the political process to overturn 
capitalism.175 The Communist party would build support among the common people, giving them 
cohesion and a presence in politics.176 Thus we have in Gramsci both a rejection of fatalism177 and 
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a demand for “consciously planned struggle” to change society,178 at the same time as he argues 
that intellectuals and others in society play specific roles dictated by the structure of the 
economy.179  
V. The Dialectic Returns to the Forefront 
Throughout much of the period until Stalin’s death, the tension between humanism and 
determinism was often not examined deliberately. In part, this is likely due to the fact that many 
of Marx’s early works were left unpublished until after the 1
st
 World War, and due to the strict 
control exercised by the Stalinists. Thus we next turn to the post-Stalin period, when Louis 
Althusser and others began to openly examine the dialectic and what he thought it actually meant 
to Marxists. 
V.A. Louis Althusser 
Louis Althusser was a member of the French Communist Party and is of particular interest here 
since he examines the concept of humanist Marxism openly. Following the death of Stalin, there 
was, as Althusser argues, a flourishing of writing that was, in his mind, humanist to a fault.180 In 
The Humanist Controversy, Althusser takes up the question of what interpreters call the 
epistemological break, the shift between humanism and determinism in Marx’s writing or the 
division between his youthful, Hegel-and-Feurbach influenced position, and his later economic 
analyses. Althusser believes that the two different versions of Marx he has uncovered are a 
humanist and a ‘scientific’ Marx, and that if one traces the development of Marx’s writing, one 
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can find a sudden shift from what Althusser calls Marx’s Hegelian radical liberal181 roots to 
communism in the years 1843-45.182 The shift that occurs in Marx’s writing is the rejection of 
man as the subject (or agent) of history.183 Instead, Althusser’s later Marx believed that human 
beings were social animals, with particular functions, in a given context and system of 
production.184 Humans do not create things, societies, and history due to the actions they take; 
they are the product of the social relations that a given economic system creates.185 The later 
Marx used the dialectic to understand how the ownership of property, and the power that this 
provided, would create divisions in society, and tensions as a result.186  Althusser argued that 
Marx’s early humanism was simply a holdover from his youthful, Hegelian idealism.187 The 
abstract idealism of the young Marx had no practical value: his early theory had no 
understanding of the process of history, that is, of how social relations evolved over time, and 
therefore provided no basis for political praxis.188 Marx’s great theoretical contribution was 
therefore his analysis of the way in which productive forces--the way humanity builds the things 
it needs to survive in a society-- shape society, and his  later attack on humanism as being 
ideological and unscientific.189 The later Marx’s views provided an opportunity for human beings 
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to become conscious of their place in society190 and therefore to challenge both capitalism’s 
ideological support and actual structure.191   
Humanism was not Marxism in Althusser’s definition, because any concept of human 
nature that implied transcendence or universals outside of social context ignored the economic 
and social systems in which human beings lived, and which shaped them. It was not “Man” who 
made history, it was the masses who made history by their actions within a society.192 But there is 
no subject in the “masses,” no human agent at the heart of their actions.193 No human beings are 
free from “forms of historical existence of the social relations of productions,” from living within 
a society and socio-economic order that affects how they live and whom they are.194 Althusser 
argues that Marx broke from a theory based on a concept of human nature or essence, and shifted 
to a theory based on the actions of the masses and which sought to understand the process of 
history.195 The Marxist thesis as Althusser defines it analyzes the structure of society, and how it 
changes through revolutionary change.196 Those within society are indoctrinated by social 
structures such as education and religion: these provide the rules of good behaviour, or “the 
attitude that should be observed by every agent in the division of labour” and the “rules of the 
order established by class domination.”197 These structures “reproduce” the system, for they 
ensure that labour is willing and able to continue to work for capitalist production.198 
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My complaint with this position, which I discuss in more depth in later chapters, is that if 
one takes Althusser’s argument to its logical conclusion, and one accepts the assumption that 
social structures inculcate acceptance of the ruling system and the ruling class’s ideologies and 
dominance, then there is no reason to believe that the lower classes would ever have reason to 
revolt. If one takes the economic and political system to be determinant, then it is not very far to 
say that the system will reinforce itself infinitely, and there is no explanation in Althusser of how 
it is that these structures change or create change over time.199 
V.B. The Miliband-Poulantzas Debate 
This leads us quite naturally into the debate between Ralph Miliband and Nicos Poulantzas. I 
review here the debate itself, and the positions both men articulated in some of their major 
works. The debate took place as a result of Poulantzas’ 1969 review of The State and Capitalist 
Society. The primary argument Poulantzas makes is two-fold: that Miliband’s analysis over-
emphasizes the role of elites within the state, as opposed to class conflict;200 and Miliband’s 
analysis ignores the power of ideology to shape agents within the state, and society.201 Both 
criticisms stem from Poulantzas’ idea that class conflict forms an overarching structure in all 
elements of society, and that shapes the ideas, language, and actions of members of society. So, 
the state, like every other part of society, serves the ruling class in the end.202 While he does not 
describe it in any depth here, a major part of Poulantzas’ arguments elsewhere involve the 
concept of over-determination. Over-determination, in essence, is the idea that regardless of 
whatever social structure in a given society is defined by Poulantzas as being dominant, it is still 
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the economic basis of that society which determines which such social structure is dominant 
according to the distribution of ownership at the economic level.
203
 While the state, or religion, 
ideology, or class, may play the ‘lead role’ in any society, the economy over-determines this by 
placing each of these into the lead role. Poulantzas believes Miliband placed undue emphasis on 
the power of elite agents instead of an analysis of class conflict.204 The elites within society who 
are placed in leadership positions within the state bear that social role due to their class 
positions.205   
Miliband replied in the following issue of New Left Review, in the first months of 1970. 
He retorted that Poulantzas was essentially accusing him of preferring facts to theory: instead of 
looking at the roles elites in the state actually play, Poulantzas had already decided to argue that 
whatever role they played had to be seen as part of class conflict and explained as such.206 The 
epistemological position of Poulantzas, he argued, was that agents in society play roles given to 
them by the structure of society. Instead of acting as independent agents of the state within 
capitalist society, Poulantzas’ argument goes so far as to suggest that structural constraints 
caused by class conflict determine the actions of those agents.207 This Miliband labels “super-
determinism,” in that ideology and class position enforce strict rules of action on agents despite 
any other roles a person may have outside of his or her class.208 That they do not always do so 
should be readily apparent, and yet by clinging to an epistemology that says these agents must 
operate according to their class, Poulantzas has, in Miliband’s opinion, ignored facts that might 
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contradict a theory.  
To provide the reader more depth on the subject, let us next turn to the arguments these 
two writers made in their other works. 
V.C. Nicos Poulantzas’ Position 
Poulantzas, like Miliband and Althusser, wrote after the end of the Stalinist period in Russia. A 
French Communist Party member of Greek origins, Poulantzas continued to write until his death 
in October, 1979.209 In Poulantzas’ conception of Marxism, the dialectical structure of society 
involved a discourse between the various parts of that society, wherein each individual part’s 
actions affected every other part and the structure of the whole. The structure of that society was 
‘over-determined’ by the economic system that the society relied upon to handle its material 
needs. The mode of production that society uses to fulfill its various needs, he argues, acts as a 
schematic for the economy, politics, and the ideas a society holds in common.210 While some 
particular structures are on occasion dominant, taking the lead in deciding the organization of 
society, it is the economic model that over-determines which structure plays this lead role.211 The 
relationship is one in which “the structure in dominance governs the very constitution (the 
nature) of the regional structures, by assigning them their place and by distributing their 
functions to them.”212 Social structures, such as religious organizations, the state, firms, families 
and individuals, form a social matrix, or a society’s make-up, character, and so forth, as 
determined by the dominant structure. These relations of production, caused by the division of 
labour necessary to produce society’s needs and wants, determine, in the last instance, the 
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structure of the system.213  An agent or structure’s role is determined by the class conflict, which 
is in turn determined by the relations of production at the base of the whole system. 
Poulantzas’ position becomes more complicated when he attempts to deal with the role of 
the agent within his model. He argues that agents are principally defined by their role in the 
economic sphere, that is, where it is within the division of labour in a given society that they 
operate, and the relative power this role assigns an agent.214 In the end, Poulantzas argues that it 
is those who have ownership over the economic system, and ownership of the ability to produce 
goods in society, who have the most power, for they control the ability to create wealth and 
power in the first place.215 His answer to the issue of determinism is that the role of the state or 
any agent to the economy is that of a discourse: they affect each other in turn by what occurs 
within them.216 The economy may be determinate in the last instance, but the actions that occur at 
the level of the state have a feedback effect, changing the economy and thus the structures above 
it, the state included. This would be a fine answer to the humanist/determinist debate but he still 
argues that the economy over-determines the structure of society, even if and when other 
structures are supposedly dominant. The role of agents and the structure of society itself are 
previously determined by the economy, and any action is constrained by the social structures that 
result from a given economic foundation.  
V.D. Ralph Miliband’s Position 
Miliband wrote in England, after fleeing Belgium during the Second World War, teaching in the 
US during the McCarthy era, and writing after Stalin’s death.217 Miliband argues that while the 
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ruling class, that group which owns the means of production in society,218 has power in the state, 
it is not because of structural reasons. The bureaucrats who are already members of the ruling 
class act in favour of policies that support business and capitalism, because it is the group to 
whom they are closest and because it is in their interest to do so as members of that class.219 They 
are not bound solely by their class positions, however, since they must often act against the 
short-term goals of capitalists to defend workers and the ruled classes and thus prevent uprising. 
Agents within the state can act independently of their class to ensure the conservation of the 
society as is.220 While Miliband recognizes the power that social structures have in affecting the 
actions of members of a society, he argues that the actions of agents within society also affect the 
structures. Political activity helps to shape the economy, as even the later Marx himself 
admitted.221 Miliband argues that while there is the possibility of succumbing to economic 
determinism, the core of Marxist philosophy remains an analysis of the conflict between classes 
and of the social structures that result from the class struggle.222 The social structures that result 
from the struggle do not stay static, because the various sides in that struggle continue to jockey 
for more power. Furthermore, it is the actions of agents within the struggle that shape the 
societies in which they live, not the structure of the economy that determines those actions. His 
argument remains deeply humanist: it is people, not structures, who control the economy.223 
Social structures may impose some restraints, but these structures in and of themselves provide 
only a form of power to be used by agents within the society.224 How it is used depends on the 
agents in question. 
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This chapter has attempted to summarize the history of the dialectic, as best as possible. As such, 
I can only provide examples of how the various Marxist thinkers, as well as Marx and Hegel 
themselves, understood the dialectic in their writing. I have therefore identified two strains of 
Marxism: the humanist model, which sees the dialectic as a way of understanding how human 
beings, as creative agents, interact with the world and society around them; and the determinist 
model, which seeks to establish laws for how it is that society evolves over time. Thus the one is, 
as Norma Levine argues, an epistemology, the other an ontology: one is a way of understanding 
the world through conceptual models, the other is an argument as to how the world actually is. I 
shall, in the following chapter, attempt to flesh out the determinist model, and then demonstrate 
what I believe to be its logical flaws. I shall then turn to the humanist model, and attempt to 
demonstrate why it is a more logical position for Marxism to take in the future. 
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Chapter Three: Determinism 
I. Outline 
 
This particular chapter examines the theory of determinist Marxism. Thus far, I have attempted 
only to classify writers and theoretical models that appear to fit into what I call determinism, 
which I define in more detail here, along with what determinism means within Marxist thought. I 
will endeavour to provide a general definition of determinist Marxism, and examine what it is 
that determinist Marxism makes of Marx’s dialectical model. I shall then examine, in brief, the 
determinist idea of social change, in particular, its focus on the economic ‘necessity’ of the fall 
of capitalism. I shall endeavour to show that determinism often espouses a belief in prophecies of 
the future, and in particular, of the inevitability of socialism. I will also establish the differences 
between structuralism and determinism, since at first glance, the previous chapter could provide 
the reader with the impression that I am conflating the two, which is not my intent. There are 
differences between these two schools of thought, but they share similar flaws. I will examine 
the differences between these two variations of determinism below. Last, I shall try to break 
down the determinist model on the whole, and examine some of its flaws. I will try, throughout 
this chapter, to provide the reader with a fair description of the determinist model of Marxism, 
and spare critical commentary as much as possible until the last section. 
II.A. What is Determinism? The Model 
Determinist Marxism takes the economy to be the element within society that is responsible for 
the way society is organized, and that the distribution of ownership over the economy influences 
how change occurs over time in a given society. This above all is what defines a model of 






caused or determined by the distribution of the economy.225 Every individual in a society has 
needs, such as the need for food to avoid starvation, shelter to avoid exposure to the elements, 
and so forth. The manner in which the society resolves these needs is through the economy, or 
the various methods/means of production that result in the satiation of needs within the society. 
Since no individual human being can, by him or herself, handle every single task that needs to be 
performed for his or her survival, a division of labour occurs.226 One person, for example, might 
be responsible for growing the grain in a field, and another for processing the grain, and another 
for distributing it. The larger a society is, the larger the division of labour becomes as it allows 
for more complicated production processes, and more output. The division of labour also creates 
power for those who own the means of production. The means of production are both the raw 
materials and tools necessary to produce a given product. No production process can exist 
without some form of property, Marx argued.227 Someone inevitably has to own both the tools 
and the land one uses for production, and also the goods that are produced as a result of that 
production process. Whomever has control over the means of production in a society is therefore 
a member of the dominant class, since they own the ability to produce wealth and the needs of 
society in the first place.  
Marx defined the relations of production as the ownership over the means of production, 
which create the various political, ideological, religious, and social structures that form in 
society. So, for example, if a small number of hereditary rulers have control over the land that is 
farmed in an agrarian society, it is because of this that they are the ruling class, and many of the 
political structures in that society will be based upon enforcing their rule at the economic level. 
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The owning class is involved in a dialectical struggle with its antithesis, the class that it directly 
exploits and oppresses, economically and politically, to ensure its dominance. In feudalism, the 
lord oppressed the peasant. In capitalism, the capitalist oppresses the worker.  
At first glance, it might seem like capitalism has a perfectly acceptable balance of power 
between the labourer and the capitalist. After all, the capitalist cannot make money without the 
labourer to produce the goods the former must sell. Meanwhile, the labourer needs the capitalist 
for the job that will provide her with the money she needs to buy food and shelter.228 Marx based 
his analysis of how wealth was produced on the concept of surplus value in labour. Marx 
believed, like Adam Smith and other economists of his time, that value in a commodity was only 
derived from the amount of human labour put into it.229 To make money, the capitalist must 
somehow make more money than she puts into the process of production: the labour cost and the 
cost of the tools and raw material necessary for a given product. To do this, the capitalist must 
derive surplus value from the labour put into the production process. The pay that the labourer 
receives is, supposedly, enough to keep her fed and sheltered. But any labour above and beyond 
this basic amount creates surplus labour, and therefore, more product and value than the labourer 
is paid for.230 This creates a conflict as the labourer’s work is exploited by the capitalist for the 
sole profit of the latter. This makes sense, in a way, in that without doing this the business of the 
capitalist would not survive, for he would not be making any money. And this is an obvious 
enough antagonism in any employer/employee relationship: the conflict between profit and 
wages. The result of this antagonism, Marx believed, was a conflict over the means of 
production. It is this conflict in capitalism, and similar conflicts over ownership of the means of 
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production in previous eras, that determine the way in which societies change. As one group 
gains more power at the economic or political level, the society is therefore changed in turn. But 
it is, in the end, the economic distribution of power that determines the structure of society, since 
ownership and power at this level grant control over the very foundation of the society itself: it’s 
ability to create both wealth and the goods necessary for its continued survival.  
Marx argued that it was inevitable that there would be a decline in the rate of profit, as 
labour would no longer be able to provide enough surplus value to maintain growth.231 With this 
decline in profits would come crises, when capitalism’s reliance on surplus labour and 
exploitation would cease to be able to provide wealth and profit to the society.232 At these times, 
the unemployment of labourers, combined with the inability of capitalism to produce wealth, 
would necessitate revolutionary change in the ownership of the means of production, and with 
this change in ownership of the economy would come changes in the rest of the society. In other 
words, society would have to adapt and find new ways to handle the production of the goods it 
needed to survive. Marx believed that such crises would eventually destroy capitalism, and result 
in the creation of a new social order: socialism.  
Thus the determinist dialectical model of Marxism believes that the relationship between 
the dominant and subordinate classes of a given society is the result of the difference in the 
degree of their ownership of the means of production and the economic distribution of power in a 
society. The conflict between them is at the base of all social change; it determines the structure 
of society, and the way it evolves. 
II.B. Differences of Interpretation. 
Determinist Marxism has two different forms, outside of structuralism. The first is that of the 
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later Marx, and the second is that of Engels and later interpreters. I have, thus far, described the 
model of Marx, which forms the basis of Engel’s brand of determinism. However, a more 
fundamental difference emerges between Marx and Engels in terms of what they believe the 
dialectic to be. Even the later Marx still held his vision of the dialectic to be a model, as a means 
of understanding how it was that society evolved over time. Engels, however, believed that the 
dialectic explained the way society actually was. This difference is very important since Engels, 
as the person who largely defended Marxism after Marx’s death and became in many ways the 
founder of what was considered ‘orthodox’ Marxism, was therefore responsible for much of how 
later Marxists understand their own theory. The difference between Marx and Engels is this: 
where Marx believed that his model could explain how society evolved over time, within reason, 
Engels believed that the model was, in fact, the way society was actually structured and 
evolves.233 Therefore, the economy actually did determine the structure of the rest of the society. 
To be a Marxist, in Engels’ sense, meant to be someone who understood how society actually 
evolved, as opposed to ‘bourgeois’ pretensions of philosophy and humanist Marxism which 
claimed such knowledge but was in fact a form of false consciousness. I make this distinction 
here for one key reason: it helps to explain why it was that determinist Marxism was and is so 
appealing to Marxists. If one could claim one’s argument to represent the real world, as it is, as 
opposed to the ‘false consciousness’ of humanists and the bourgeoisie, it makes one’s argument 
seem more powerful. This claim to ontology, to an understanding of the real world as it actually 
is, also led later Marxists to accept their theoretical model as a doctrine and a dogma. If their 
theory really explains how the world works, then of course it must be accepted by all Marxists as 
an article of faith!  
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III. Base and Superstructure, or Organic Whole? 
In discussing the role of the economy in determinism, it will be helpful to take a brief detour and 
discuss the difference between two concepts within determinist Marxism, particularly within the 
writings of the later Marx. Melvin Rader establishes these two models as being the “base and 
superstructure” model, and the “organic” model, although he does not consider either as part of a 
division between determinism or humanism in Marxism.234 He considers these to be two of the 
three models used by Marx in his lifetime. The third model is closer to Hegel’s position of a 
conflict between parts within a whole, which through their interaction create change.235 The first 
two, however, were the ones used by Marx in his later life, the period in which he established the 
determinist version of Marxism. The base and superstructure model in particular is perhaps the 
most famous Marxist approach to the relationship between the economy and the other social 
structures in a given society. In this model, the relationship between the base and superstructure 
is quite often interpreted in what Rader calls a “fundamentalist” fashion, meaning that many 
determinist Marxists interpret the relationship between the base and superstructure as causal.236 
The base is described by Marx as being the economic foundations of society, that is, the means 
of production as we have thus far described them. The superstructure, meanwhile, includes the 
state, religions, education, and a host of various social structures that result from the manner in 
which the economy is structured. Marx himself, however, may not necessarily have believed that 
the relationship was strictly causal, that is, that the base determines the manner in which the 
superstructure acts and is formed.237  
                                                                                                                                                                                           
233
     Engels, “Socialism: Utopian and Scientific,” 694. 
234
     Rader, Melvin, Marx’s Interpretation of History, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1979), Xviii 
235
     Ibid. 
236
     Ibid., 6. 
237






That Engels, and some determinists, take the base and superstructure to be literal and 
causal should be readily apparent. The relationship almost requires a causal link: a base must 
precede a superstructure, after all.238 This explains to a certain degree the way in which 
determinism sees the relationship between the economy and the rest of society. If, as I have 
previously argued in this chapter, the distribution of economic power forms the basis for how the 
rest of society is structured, then it is only logical to assume that such things as politics, ideology, 
and religion play a secondary role akin to that of a superstructure built atop the base of the 
economy. 
Marx did come up with a second model in his later life, that of an organic relationship 
between all parts of society. In this model, all the various parts of a social whole interrelate, and 
affect each other by their interactions.239 This model appears much closer to his original Hegelian 
concept, as Rader defines it, wherein the model of society Marx creates is one in which all the 
intricate parts of a social whole interact in a dialectical conflict, and thus create change with each 
action.240 Similarly, the organic model helps explain how it is that society maintains itself in a 
given form, for a society can only continue to be called capitalist if it has certain relations of 
production and methods of producing the goods necessary to its survival. Without any one of 
those parts it will cease to function as a capitalist society. Determinist Marxists have used this 
model as well. For example, in the previous chapter, I briefly discussed Rosa Luxemburg’s 
Reform or Revolution. One of the points she makes throughout the text is that, in her mind, the 
problem with the reformist agenda was its misunderstanding of the nature of capitalism. In 
particular, she believed that capitalism could not survive as capitalism without any one of its 
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various parts.241 Since reformism sought to change capitalism without, in her mind, transcending 
it or truly changing the methods or relations of production within capitalism, the project was 
doomed to fail from the start. Nicos Poulantzas’s model is similar to the organic model, in that 
the whole of society acts in what I have earlier called a discourse. Each part of the society, 
including the economy and the state and religion, all act upon each other, and thus change both 
each part and the social whole. 
Like the base/superstructure model, the organic model remains determinist. At first, this 
might seem odd, considering that the organic model proposes that each part of the social whole 
has a role to play in shaping each other part. However, there is no human agency in this model 
any more than there is in the base/superstructure model. Instead, each part of the society acts 
upon each other part, and, like the base/superstructure model, each person plays a specific role in 
that society.242 In some cases (Poulantzas, in particular), the organic model is explicitly ‘over-
determined,’ meaning that the economy still determines what form the society takes and the 
strength and weakness of the other parts of society. 
To be as clear as possible, then, the major difference between the humanist model and the 
determinist model is that the former argues that it is human agents who make changes in their 
society, and the latter argues that it is social structures and the economic structure of society that 
determine how society changes over time. Any model that espouses human agency is a humanist 
Marxist model, while any that argues that it is social forces, social structures, or the economy 
that determines the structure of society and change is inherently determinist. At this point, it will 
therefore be appropriate to examine the determinist Marxist position on how social change 
occurs. 
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IV. Structuralism versus Determinism 
Up until now, I have included structuralism within the larger category of determinism. While I 
still hold this to be an accurate assessment of structuralism, the reader would not be at fault if he 
or she does not yet see why this is so from the argument thus far. Structuralism is different from 
determinism in its emphasis, but remains similar in its conclusions, in that it focuses in on the 
power and the effect of social structures--the state, church, education, and so forth-- but, like 
‘classic’ determinism, it still holds that human agency does not determine the course of the 
development of a society over time. Instead, structuralism argues that social structures are 
organized due to their positions within the class conflict over the economy, and that the internal 
contradictions that result from their role in the class conflict help determine how they will act 
and how they affect social changes. Above all, structuralism focuses, in particular, on defining 
the nature and function of social structures within society as understood by Marxism. Thus both 
Poulantzas and Althusser attempt to understand the role of the state, church, religion, and so 
forth within capitalism, and their impact on the other social structures in a given society. 
Althusser spells out the difference between structuralism and humanism quite clearly when he 
argues that there is no “Man,” no agent, in the “masses,” which he defines as those large 
agglomerations of people in a society who act in a society.243 No human being is free from the 
social and economic structures that exist within their society at the time in which they live.244 
Determinism, in the classic sense that I have described above, sees social change occurring as a 
result of changes in the ownership of the methods/means of production in a given society. The 
primary difference between the two, then, is that classic determinism sees the economy and 
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control over it as that which determines the course of social evolution in society. Structuralism 
takes this as a given, as well, but argues that social structures have specific roles to play in the 
economic struggle, and a form of agency of their own as a result of the power granted to them by 
those roles.  
For example, Althusser describes the effect of social structures ‘above’ the economy (in 
the superstructure) that have an impact on the relations of production as well. Althusser analyzes 
the impact of “Ideological State Apparatuses,” such as religion and education, that play a role in 
indoctrinating the members of society in both the practical skills they need to support the 
economy and the ideological “rules of the game.”245 Poulantzas, similarly, examines the manner 
in which the various social structures affect each other, and act in a massive feedback loop upon 
the economy, affecting each other in turn.246 Both, however, accept that the economy determines 
which structures have the most power, and the role they play, but that the structures do have a 
certain degree of power within, and a degree of autonomy as a result of, those roles. 
Structuralism, however, seems to follow Rader’s organic model of Marxist dialectics, while the 
determinist follow the more classic base-and-superstructure model. The organic model, recall, is 
one in which it is argued that the whole of society acts like a giant organism, with each part 
playing specific roles necessary to the survival of the organism and acting upon each other part, 
while the base/superstructure model posits that the economy forms the base for all the other parts 
and determines the role and actions the other parts play/are capable of in the class struggle. In 
any case, both models share the same position about the ‘agent’ of change in society in history. 
Both structuralism and determinism do not accept the idea that human agents make history. 
Instead, it is social structures, or the economy, in any given society that condition human beings 
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within that society to play certain roles, whether those roles be ‘capitalist,’ ‘managerial,’ or 
‘proletariat.’ Both accept that these roles govern the rules of behaviour for human beings within 
the society, and that it is therefore social structures of some sort that determine how changes will 
occur. This is because a change in a structure would, logically, have an impact on the role and 
behaviour of the human beings who ‘inhabit’ those structures. The only major difference 
between the two models of determinism is which structures have more power: the economy, for 
classic determinism, or other social structures within a given society, for structuralist 
determinism. That the economy over-determines or is responsible for deciding what role and 
what degree of power each structure has is the connection between the two theories: the 
economic control over resources and the power to produce the necessities for survival in society 
grant both classes and the structures of society with the power they possess. This division of 
control and power in society determine the manner in which society will evolve over time as the 
contradictions internal to the economy, or the social structures, will result in conflict and 
revolutionary transition from one form of society to another. 
V. Crisis and Prophecy 
The determinist model, overall, describes the way in which the economy in a society determines 
the structure of the society. Inherent to the determinist position, however, is the idea that the way 
the productive forces of society are set up will, in Marx’s words, “come in conflict with the 
existing relations of production, or--what is but a legal expression for the same thing--with the 
property relations within which they have been at work hitherto.”247 In other words, the various 
social structures that the economy has created and the antagonisms between classes that result 
will, in time, become fetters that prevent the economy from continuing to develop, and thus 
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“begins an epoch of social revolution.”248 Marx fleshes this concept out in Capital, when he 
describes the tendency of the rate of profit to decline. He argues that there will come a point 
when the social structures that result from the division of labour within capitalism will prevent 
capitalism from producing enough wealth for the society to function.249 It was believed that 
Marxism could predict when these crises would occur, and therefore help Marxists lead the 
working class within capitalism to a successful revolution against the bourgeoisie. Ironically, it is 
at this point that determinist Marxism shows a mild degree of humanism or voluntarism: the 
working class must act upon the crises of capitalism in order to ensure that the revolution will 
occur. However, with these crises comes the tendency of the various social structures to react in 
favour of capitalism. The simple version of this theory involves the idea that the state will always 
act as a simple tool of the capitalist class and come to its defense. The role and function of any 
given structure depends, in the determinist model, upon its position in the class struggle, and its 
actions are to be understood in light of the conflict between classes to control the means of 
production and the various tools of the ruling class such as the state. 
These crises are considered inevitable by determinist Marxism, and it is a commonplace 
in this theory that the revolutionary transition that will result will transfrom capitalism into 
socialism. This has been for so long the common prophecy of determinist Marxism that it is 
often held to be one of the core ideas of Marxist theory in general. And to a certain degree this 
belief in their own prophecies makes sense given the determinist position. If determinism believe 
that every society is structured in such a way that there will be a conflict over the means of 
resources, then it is inevitable, based on this assumption, that the conflict will eventually result in 
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changes in the society. That socialism is the inevitable result of the end of capitalism is perhaps 
more problematic: since the relationship between bourgeoisie and worker is a directly economic 
antagonism, determinism believes that the result of the showdown between the two will result in 
the working class’ victory and the installation of a socialist society. That this has not occurred at 
all within predominantly capitalist societies is the source of much internal debate within 
Marxism, since the majority of socialist countries that have emerged have primarily been in the 
agrarian Third World, not the industrialized countries. 
In any case, determinism accepts the concept of crises, and that if there is change in 
society, then it is usually the structural configuration of society--how the economy is set up, who 
owns what, and so forth--that determines both the strengths and weaknesses of a society. The 
conflict between classes in any given social structure creates internal rifts that will inevitably 
lead to conflict and to revolution and change. If societies are set up in such a fashion as to create 
internal contradictions and conflict between parts, and the various social structures determine the 
actions and consciousness of members of the society,250 then it is logical to conclude that it is 
inevitable for that conflict to result in changes in the control of various social structures and 
therefore changes in the society itself. These internal contradictions--the conflict between wages 
and profit, the exploitative nature of labour within capitalism, the creation of the industrial 
reserve army of labourers--create tension in any given society and conflict over the control of the 
means of production. Any change in the ownership of the means of production creates changes in 
the structure of the rest of society but, in particular, Marx, and the determinist Marxists believed 
that the biggest changes would be the transition from a capitalist to a socialist society. Instead of 
private property and exploitation, society would be transformed by revolutionary activity such 
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that every human being would have ownership over the means of production. As I have 
mentioned, these crises are determined, not by the actions of the proletariat but, as Marx argued, 
by the very nature and structure of capitalism itself.251  
Marxists, of course, did not expect the capitalists to simply accept these revolutions and 
settle down to a quiet death. Instead, they would use every means at their disposal to repress and 
prevent revolutionary activity and the success of the proletariat. Thus we have the various 
analyses of the methods and tools by which the ruling class can hold power. Lenin argued that 
the state, as a tool and weapon, must be smashed due to its role in controlling the workers; 
Althusser and Poulantzas analyzed the state and other social structures, and their power to 
control the actions and beliefs of human beings in any given society.  
Determinist Marxism takes it as a given that, in any crisis, the various structures and 
‘agents’ within society will act according to their role in the class struggle, seeking to control the 
economy and the various elements of the superstructure and to use them to maintain or destroy 
the status quo. Inevitably, determinism argues, the very nature of capitalism itself will create its 
own destruction, since society is structured in such a way that the capitalist ruling class must 
exploit the proletariat, and yet simultaneously provide the proletariat with the training to run the 
industries and commerce of the capitalists for themselves.252 This training is the knowledge of 
how factories work, how production occurs, and how to make the products that machinery in the 
modern age allows society to create, and with it, Marx argues, the working class can, in a 
socialist economy, perform the same tasks but own the results of the production process 
themselves. Combined with their role as the exploited class, the conflict between proletariat and 
capitalist renders the capitalist superfluous to the system, and therefore revolutionary change is 
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required for further development.253  
Thus, determinism assumes that history will take a progressive route, since schisms 
within society can only be transcended by revolutionary transformation. To some degree, the 
conflicts between various groups within society can be mitigated or ended, but to assume that 
they can be transcended permanently (in socialism) or that the dialectical process has an end-
point seems to fly in the face of what Marx and Hegel originally argued: that society is an ever-
evolving thing, and that there is no true end to the process of the dialectic. Indeed, to assume an 
end to history or that the process of the dialectic results in progress towards ‘better’ or more 
evolved societies/human beings implies a direction and end to the dialectic that might not exist.  
VI. Strengths and Weaknesses of the Determinist Position 
I have endeavoured, until now, to define the determinist point of view and to present it in a 
neutral light, the last paragraph notwithstanding. Having done so, it is time to turn to an 
examination of the strengths and weaknesses of the model. 
If determinist Marxism does anything well, it is that it seems to explain why society is set 
up in a given fashion. Determinist Marxism has always sought to be able to provide an 
explanation for how it is that social structures are set up, and how they evolve. Determinist 
Marxism, recall, argues that the structure of the economy determines the organization of the rest 
of the society, as ownership over the means of production provides power and tools for the ruling 
class in any given society. Changes in this ownership create changes in the rest of society, and to 
a certain degree, this is true. If one group owns a great deal of the economy, this does give them 
a degree of power elsewhere in society by dint of the wealth this ownership creates. If 
determinism takes the economy to be determinant, then the rest of its arguments about the role of 
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human agents within society (such as it is), the role of social structures, and the process of social 
change would be accurate. It must also be admitted that the determinist strain of Marxism has 
had a great deal of success, for better or for worse. It had been adopted by the original major 
Communist state in Russia, becoming the doctrine of one of the most successful Communist 
regimes in China, and dominating Marxist thought throughout the middle of the 20
th
 century. It 
also has a certain intuitive appeal in claiming to understand the way the world ‘actually works,’ 
and providing an explanation for social evolution. 
And yet, I am not entirely certain that determinist Marxism has as much validity or 
explanatory power as it might seem. Determinism runs into three major problems that I will 
outline below: the first is the problem of agency; the second, the problem of historical veracity; 
the third is the problem of tautology.  
By agency, I mean choice and the ability to make choices. Determinist Marxism assumes 
either: a) in the classic sense, that the economy is that which controls the structure of society and 
how society evolves; or b) in the structuralist sense, that structures, such as ‘the masses,’ the 
state, the church, and so forth, are what determine the evolution of society. In either case, the 
agency of human beings is considered irrelevant. A human being may make choices in his or her 
daily life, of course, but determinists do not consider these choices relevant to the evolution of 
society. Instead, the agent plays a role within the context of their society and the structures 
within it according to the division of labour and their place within it and the larger struggle 
between classes. So, for example, a working-class person plays the role of opposing the 
bourgeoisie, who play the role of the ruling class in their society by dint of their ownership over 
the means of production. Some classic determinists are a bit less formal about the roles of the 
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members of society, as Marx, Lenin, and Kautsky all accepted that voluntarism--the actions of 
human agents--had an impact on the social order, at least to a certain degree. Even so, 
determinist Marxists largely accept that the actions of human agents only have as much effect as 
the social structures around them allow them to have. The role of agents within any social system 
is determined by their class and by the needs of that class.254 Given the assumptions of 
determinist Marxism, this makes sense. However, this over-emphasis on the structures of society 
as the ‘agents’ of history ignores the fact that it is the human beings within a society that actually 
make those structures. If the young Marx was correct about nothing else, he was correct about 
this: human beings create the society around them in and through their actions.255 The social 
structures that result from those actions--the church, the state, what-have-you--are either 
reinforced further or degraded by later actions: the church ceases to be as important as people 
begin to live secular lives; the state acts in the name of the capitalist class because capitalists 
within the state pressure the state’s leaders and power-brokers to do so; unions rise and fall with 
support from workers, and so forth.  
To put the structure ahead of the human agents within those structures puts the cart well 
ahead of the horse, because no structure can exist without human beings to create that structure 
in the first place! It cannot be denied that these structures have a certain degree of power once 
they have been created. But this power is not a static thing, and the very concept of ‘structures’ 
in the first place implies, falsely, that power can ever be a static, unchanging tool to be used. All 
social structures are dynamic, evolving and dependent upon the actions of human beings within 
any given society. The degree of power that people have within a given social structure varies 
with the amount of power that they give to it in resources and legitimacy, and this constantly 
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changes over time with the new actions of human agents. To assume that the economy, or social 
structures, are determinant is completely incompatible with the basis of Marx’s thought: that 
human beings are defined by their ability to create their own world. Even in his later life, Marx 
had not wholly abandoned this thesis.256 
Secondly, determinist Marxism has long held that its model accurately reflects the way 
social evolution will occur in the industrialized world. That Marxism has been wrong in many of 
these predictions should merit only a cursory review here, though this issue is extremely 
important. Determinist Marxism holds that it is the internal contradictions within a society that 
create the necessity for society to evolve over time. Therefore, it was believed that there was a 
certain logical progression to the process of that evolution: feudalism was believed to be unlikely 
to have the prerequisite conditions that would allow the development of a communist society, 
since the development of industry and therefore a working class was believed to be the basis of 
the latter. To arrive at this development of industry required the growth of the bourgeoisie into 
the ruling class. The progression was held to be from agrarian societies, to feudal societies, to 
capitalism, and thence to communism.257 Put simply, determinist Marxists largely assumed that it 
was only possible for communism to emerge in the most advanced industrial economies--the 
developed First World--and that it was highly unlikely if not impossible for communism to 
emerge in the agrarian Third World. One would have hoped that the Russian experience would 
have changed their minds. However, ever since the Russian Revolution, determinist Marxism has 
clung to the idea that it should still be in the industrialized world where the revolution occurs. 
Perhaps, as Gramsci argued, it was simply necessary to change tactics. And yet, if one believes it 
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is simply a matter of tactics and not historical necessity that the change from capitalist to 
socialist society should occur, then one has already left determinism far behind.  
Furthermore, if determinist Marxism wishes to make a claim to scientific veracity or to 
being ontologically accurate, then the experience of the past hundred years should prove the 
determinist Marxist theory false. It has not been in the First World that socialist revolutions and 
societies have emerged. Instead, socialist countries have always arisen in the agrarian Third 
World. Perhaps this is because of the strength of support for capitalism in the First World. 
Perhaps it is because of the acceptance of individualism and the separation of civil society into 
pluralist groups. Perhaps it is that Karl Polanyi is correct that the kind of mobilization necessary 
to create the kind of change from feudalism to capitalism, or capitalism to communism, is not 
possible without large-scale state intervention--and the state, as determinists argue, has never 
been on the side of the oppressed classes.258 Whatever the reason, determinist Marxism has been 
wrong time and time again in its predictions of the transition from capitalism to communism. 
The response for most Marxists has been to return to our theories, and see where we went wrong 
in our calculations. It is my suggestion here that any determinist Marxist position misses 
something crucial: the ability of human beings to make choices within society will necessarily 
create chaotic results that do not fit into a deterministic pattern. It is possible to make guesses as 
to the results of those choices, but accurate prophecies of future changes are much harder to 
come by.   
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The last issue I present here with determinist Marxism is the problem of tautology and is 
in many ways related to the last issue of historical veracity. Determinist Marxism assumes that 
the structure and makeup of all societies are determined by the economy.259 Determinism then 
argues that social structures and society will evolve according to changes that occur in the 
distribution of power in the economy. But if everything is already determined by the economy, 
then it is tautologically always true. If one holds that society’s structure is determined by the 
economy, then of course any changes in the economy will result in changes in the rest of the 
society. There is, in effect, no way to prove or disprove the determinist theory according to its 
own logical precepts. If determinist Marxism wishes to claim to be scientific, then its hypothesis 
must be testable. Instead, this tautology allows determinist Marxism to claim, even in the face of 
historical evidence that it has been wrong, that it is still accurate. Even if every other criticism I 
have raised here about the determinist theory of Marxism is found to be invalid or is corrected by 
later determinist thinkers, it is this particular issue that the determinist Marxist school of thought 
must confront, since it above all renders its theory questionable at best. If determinist Marxism is 
to be taken seriously, it must avoid this tautology--something I truly do not believe is possible 
given the determinist thesis and argument.  
VII. Summary 
I have in this chapter set out to explain the determinist model of Marxism as best as I am able. At 
its heart, determinist Marxism holds two things to be true: that social structures, not human 
agents, are what act to create changes in society, and that it is the economy in particular that 
determines how every other social structure is set up and the roles they are to play in the 
dialectical model. I find the determinist thesis to be unsatisfactory for three main reasons: it 
                                                                                                                                                                                           






ignores the role of human agents, it suffers from a lack of historical veracity, and it appears to 
fall into tautological argument while claiming a desire to be considered scientific--if it is the 
latter, its hypothesis must be testable. With this in mind, it is time to examine the humanist 
model, and to see if it both avoids these problems as well as those inherent in humanism. 
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Chapter Four: Humanist Marxism 
I. Outline 
 
Having in the previous chapter discussed determinist Marxism, I now turn to examine the 
humanist Marxist approach. My goal here is to define humanist Marxism as clearly as possible to 
provide the reader with a fair sense of the differences between it and determinist Marxism. To do 
so, I shall first define the humanist Marxist approach as it appears in Marx in more detail than 
was provided in Chapter Two, and move on to examine some of the major characteristics of the 
humanist model. These include the concepts of alienation and human agency, and, of course, the 
dialectical model of social change espoused by this particular brand of Marxism. I shall also 
briefly consider the epistemological break that occurred in, roughly, 1844-1845 in Marx’s 
writing, and examine the effects of this break on Marx’s work and theory--in short, I wish to 
establish that while some elements of his humanist youthful work continued to exist in the later 
works, Marx largely abandoned the fundamental core of what made his early work humanist. 
Finally, I shall examine some potential criticisms of the humanist model, and attempt to argue 
that, despite its flaws, the humanist Marxist model remains a better model than the determinist. 
So, let us first examine in a bit more detail the humanist model of Marxism. 
II. What is Humanist Marxism? 
Last chapter, I endeavoured to spell out what it was that made determinist Marxism 
‘determinist.’ There, I argued that the fundamental belief of determinist Marxism was its 
argument that it was social structures, particularly the economy, but not human agency, that 
determined the way societies were organized and evolved over time. So, let us be equally clear 






a society who create the society in which they live, and it is because of the actions of those 
human beings that societies evolve. This is, I believe, at complete odds with the determinist 
strain of Marxism, for while they often will use similar terminology and even accept some points 
in common, the two fundamentally disagree about what causes social change. Humanist 
Marxism, then, takes as its primary assumption the argument that Marx once made that it is 
human beings who make their world, consciously or unconsciously.260 That is, even if they are 
not fully aware of the results of their actions, human beings are agents capable of affecting the 
social structures around them in their society. This idea is derived primarily from the writing of 
Marx when he was a young man, and as I have pointed out elsewhere, from the period extending 
up until the epistemological break in 1844-45 that occurred shortly after or during the writing of 
the Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts. 
The reader may recall my commentary on the young Marx in chapter two of the present 
text, but it may help to provide a bit more detail on his argument here. The young Marx, 
influenced by Hegelian dialectics and the thoughts of Feuerbach, Hess, and others, argued that 
human beings were different from other animals in their ability to consciously create products in 
the real world. Just as in his later writing, Marx accepted that human beings were social animals 
who came together in any given society in order to create the goods necessary to their own 
survival, since no human being could survive on their own.261 Unlike his own later writing, 
however, the young Marx argued that it was the actions these human beings took in society that 
determined how the economy, the division of labour and the material conditions of production, 
would take shape: our actions, unlike other animals, are conscious, and define both ourselves and 
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the societies in which we live.262 Human beings engaged, as he put it in the “Theses on 
Feuerbach,” in revolutionary praxis, or activity, since their every action in a social structure 
helped to define and then redefine that structure’s organization.263 Where the determinist position 
is that the material conditions of societies condition or determine the way in which the economy 
and division of labour are set up, humanist Marxism argues that it is the choices human beings in 
a given set of social and economic conditions make that determines the way the economy and the 
society itself are set up. 
But there are two models of the dialectic within the young Marx’s writing, and the 
differences between them must be examined first before we can continue and examine some of 
the concepts described thus far in more detail. The first is the model that Marx turned to as he 
followed, however briefly, in Feuerbach’s footsteps. The second model is one that is closer to 
Hegel’s own. The first is derived from both Feuerbach and Marx’s own interpretations of his 
writing. The reader will recall that in the second chapter of this text that I briefly discussed how 
the young Marx came to be associated with the Young or Left Hegelians, one of whom was 
Feuerbach. Feuerbach, like Marx, took from Hegel the concept of the dialectic, and its particular 
application to societies and the way that they evolve over time. Feuerbach rejected Hegel’s 
emphasis on the evolution of ideas over time, calling for a materialist conception of history.264 
Hegel’s analysis was certainly more complicated than I suspect Feuerbach makes it out to be, but 
there is a kernel of truth to his argument: Hegel saw much of the movement of history to be the 
result of changes in human conception and understanding of the world. Hegel argued (among 
other things) that history was the process of Spirit coming to understand itself.265 Instead, 
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Feuerbach argued that the historical process occurred as the result of the alienation of human 
agents from the objects they produced--an idea Marx would use at various points throughout his 
career.266 In creating an object, a person objectified herself in that object. Once it was created, 
however, the object ceases to be under her control, and has an existence outside of her.267 
Feuerbach saw the entirety of history as the struggle to overcome this alienation, and to some 
extent, Marx continued in this vein. The Feuerbachian version of humanist Marxism, then, took 
the dialectic to be an examination of the way in which reality actually worked: a conflict between 
human beings that results from the alienation of their own creative activity. Much of the 
humanist period of Marx’s writing was taken up with his examination of this particular model of 
Hegel’s dialectic, his other version of the model (detailed next), and then the rejection of both in 
favour of his later, economic determinist model. 
But Marx, as I said, rejected the Feuerbachian conception of the dialectic. Much of his 
efforts shifted towards the creation of an economic model of the dialectic, and one that could be 
used more easily for polemics and mass-agitation: in many ways, the Manifesto of the 
Communist Party is the result of this work, by which point, Marx had largely abandoned his 
earlier humanism. What little there is of Marx’s non-Feuerbachian humanism I shall now attempt 
to describe. Marx had, in the “Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right,” described his concept of 
the dialectic in terms similar to that of Feuerbach: a struggle, internal to human beings, to 
overcome the alienation that occurs in the process of creating an object (this object can be a 
simple tool, a product, even something more complicated like an idea).268 But by the time of the 
Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts, Marx had already begun to flesh this out in the 
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context of social change. Marx argued that alienation occurs in a social context when one is 
involved in the division of labour. Because one is involved in a small part of the production 
process in a society, one is divorced from the product one creates--the labourer does not own the 
fruit of her own labour.269 At first, this may read like the Feuerbachian conception of the dialectic 
I have described above: it might be taken as a description of the world as it actually is. 
And yet, there is a fundamental difference between the two models, for Marx describes 
the dialectic as the means by which one can understand the real world: it is a conceptual 
construct, a tool to be used. The dialectic is the process by which human beings interact, as 
subjects, with the objects around them and with themselves. This is described in some depth in 
the 1844 Manuscripts, and follows very closely Hegel’s own model. This dialectical model here 
describes how a human being, as subject, perceives an object as different from himself. But to 
understand the object as different from the self requires that the human being understand what is 
meant by self, so the dialectical ‘gaze’ is directed inward: one recognizes oneself as both subject 
and object.270 This is because the human being sees oneself as an object that can be examined (by 
the self and by others), but also as the subject that is performing the act of perception (the self).271 
This is, in itself, a form of alienation, in that one recognizes that while one might identify oneself 
as a subject, to others, she is merely an object of study. This objectified version of herself 
becomes something that, like any other alienated thing, takes on value in and of itself, separate 
from the object in question (the idealized self, or one’s public image/reputation). This takes on a 
value external to the object in and of itself. This is alienation, the division of the self, or objects, 
from their real existence by the process of human understanding. In objectifying other things in 
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the world, including the things we ourselves create, we give them a false value, and this value 
can take on a life of its own (of a sort). As a classic example, one can look at money, as Marx did 
at various points.272 Money has no intrinsic value, it is simply a particularly shiny metal, or a 
piece of paper. But we recognize it as having value in commerce, and soon, this takes on a value 
all its own: the pursuit of wealth is seen as a virtue, and the accumulation of wealth soon has 
other, related meanings--power, fame, and such.  
The point, however, of this long digression on alienation, is that that alienation only 
exists because we, as conscious human beings, objectify the things around us and give them 
meaning through a dialectical process, which Marx struggled to identify. Society and all the 
social structures within it only had the meaning given to them because human beings gave those 
structures that meaning. The state has meaning and power because human beings conceptualize 
it as such. If one could understand the method by which human beings alienate themselves and 
create meaning for the objects around them, Marx argued that one could come to understand how 
societies came to be and how they change over time.273 If one assigns meaning to the state as an 
object, that meaning can be challenged through action. The actions of human beings in a society 
give strength to those meanings or challenge them-- for example if one supports the state through 
actions such as joining the military or accepting the laws that the state drafts for the society.  
The division of labour, recall, was the process by which people were assigned to different 
parts of the production process. This in itself was a result of human activity, and was largely 
responsible for the make-up of the rest of society. The problem is that frequently human beings 
had not been conscious of the effect of their actions, and it had been a haphazard process at best. 
In trying to resolve the exploitation and class conflict that resulted from the division of labour, 
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the actions human beings took established social structures and rules by which the society would 
operate. In early societies, this may not have been explicitly set down-- a tribal chieftain may 
have ruled by might and whim, establishing and breaking laws as he or she saw fit. In modern 
societies, these rules are given form in laws and constitutions. But these too have come to have a 
value external to themselves: laws were the manner in which human beings codified the division 
of labour, providing it with a legitimacy it might not otherwise have. While many use the 
“Theses on Feuerbach” to their own cause, I admit to some mild hope that this is the meaning of 
Marx’s comment that “it is essential to educate the educator himself… The coincidence of the 
changing of circumstances and of human activity or self-changing can be conceived and 
rationally understood only as revolutionary practice.”274 In plain language, then, by 
understanding the manner in which human beings have set up society as a process of alienation 
and various methods of resolving that alienation, Marx hoped that human beings would be able 
to both comprehend and change the society around them.  
The difference, then, between humanist Marxism and Hegel’s model, or that of 
Feuerbach, is as follows: humanist Marxism accepts the primacy of human beings as the agents 
of history (unlike Hegel). Marxist humanism accepts that its model is conceptual: it is a manner 
of understanding social evolution, but that change must occur in the real world as the result of 
this understanding-- unlike Feuerbach, who believed both that his model accurately reflected the 
real world, and that understanding it was enough (that this understanding was a change in the 
world in and of itself).275 Human beings, by their actions, shape the societies in which they live, 
and the humanist Marxist model is an attempt to understand how this occurs. By understanding 
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it, Marx hoped that it could lead to action that would change the structure of society--in effect, 
humanist Marxism is a method of making social change a conscious affair on the part of human 
beings. Each action, of course, would create new changes in society to be analyzed, and in turn, 
the analysis of society and the self within it, like the process I described above, would create 
changes in the self because one has a new understanding of the world. Marxism of this humanist 
variety, then, is a conceptual model that serves as a rough guide for understanding the way we 
have built our social world, and for changing it. It is, for lack of a better phrase, a form of 
philosophical scientific method for understanding the object it studies: the evolution of human 
society. 
Now remains the task of establishing the implications of this model, and its concept of 
human agency--that is, how is it that humanist Marxism understands human action and its effects 
on the object of its study (society). I must also discuss the source of some of the major 
difficulties in examining the young Marx: the epistemological break that occurred shortly after 
the writing of the 1844 Manuscripts, the result of which was that the humanist model was never 
given the depth of analysis that was given his later, determinist model. But first, let us examine 
alienation in some further depth, in order to give the reader a sense of what it is that, along with 
human agency, is at the core of the dialectic of the humanist Marxist position. 
III. Alienation 
The two key elements to the cognitive model of humanist Marxism that I am endeavouring to 
describe here are alienation and human agency. Let us look at alienation first, here, since it is a 
key part to understanding what it is that Marxist humanism believes human agency is directed 
towards resolving. Again, it must be mentioned that this idea of alienation is a conceptual 






their world. In other words, alienation is not a physical thing, but something that human beings 
construct in their own minds. What is alienation then? I have touched on this topic elsewhere in 
the paper, albeit briefly. Alienation has several meanings within Marx’s writings, but the clearest 
definition of it that I can provide here is that alienation is the mental realization that an object 
(the self, a product, society, or what-have-you) is not part of the self.276 Where Hegel, for 
example, would have been content enough with this classification, Marx took alienation to 
involve the realization that is made by the mind of the separation between oneself and the 
product(s) of one’s labour.277 Partly, then, alienation is caused by the realization that one does not 
own the thing that one creates, particularly since society divides labour in such a way that the 
product one creates is never wholly produced by or owned by those who make it--although 
capitalism certainly simplifies the process by having ownership of most of social production in 
the hands of a very small number of people. And yet, alienation is also, as I have mentioned, an 
internal thing to the human being. Alienation occurs whenever a human being produces 
anything--since production also involves consciousness in the act of conceptualizing what we 
produce-- including both physical objects and “social constructs” like the state and society. 
When human beings produce a thing, it is no longer contained in the mind, but separate from it. 
This separation is the first part of alienation. What happens next is a large part of how Marxist 
humanism sees as the ‘cause’ of changes in society--if such a cause can ever be isolated. 
The next part of alienation is the transition from the divorce between the self and the 
other, the subject and the object, to the reification of the object as having a value separate from 
the human mind that creates that value in the first place.278 A famous example is the reification of 
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money. Marx once wrote that money had been given a value in and of itself.279 Money was, in 
and of itself, meaningless. And yet, once created and used in society as a form of wealth and 
something that could define the value of other objects, it was taken to have a value in and of 
itself. As the reader may well have already gathered, this second form of alienation has a very 
real aspect to it in society: it is a conceptual metaphor for the value that human beings assign to 
social structures, such as money. By giving these objects value, the human beings within a 
society have already ceded some degree of power to the objects. Marx’s point, however, should 
be equally clear. What power these structures possess is not due to any intrinsic virtue or vices in 
themselves. They are given meaning, and power, only so long as people allow them to have it. 
The last stage of alienation involves the transformation of the alienated object into a 
fetish.280 A fetish is often a symbol of holy power, a talisman that is believed to be possessed by 
spirits, gods, or to be a god-like thing in and of itself. For example, someone might hold up a 
crucifix in prayer, believing that the symbol of the murdered Christ is, in itself, holy, and has a 
power in and of itself. A symbol that once represented one’s faith in the divine comes, with the 
process of alienation, to be something holy in and of itself in the mind of the subject believing in 
it. So too with much else in human society. Take for instance our earlier example of money 
possessing a value in and of itself. This was the second part of the process of alienation, but 
money becomes a fetish when it is believed to possess not just value, but power and, in the most 
extreme examples, a sentience of its own.281 But again, this ‘intrinsic’ value is something that 
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human beings have given these objects, whether consciously or otherwise. If money, or 
commerce, or the state, have any value in and of themselves, it is because human beings, in the 
process of the division of labour, assigned people certain tasks within society that needed to be 
completed in order for society to survive.282 A brief note should be made here that these three 
types of alienation, while presented in a sequential order, are not seen as occurring in that order 
by Marxism. Instead, they are three parts of the same phenomenon, the process whereby human 
beings become alienated from the objects they make and with which they are surrounded--
including themselves. 
These tasks, the property relations that result from the division of labour, and everything 
within society, come, through the process of alienation, to have a meaning and a value outside of 
basic survival activities. Alienation occurs very much without conscious activity on the part of 
the person in question, in that it is, as I have mentioned, a process that occurs whenever the 
human subject recognizes that an object is different from the self. In assigning meaning to that 
other object, it is natural to assign a value to the object in assessing what the object is, what it 
does, and how a human being interacts with it. This is a natural process, in a way, in that it has to 
happen as a result of human self-consciousness: if there is to be a self, it cannot be recognized as 
such by a sentient being without there being an other, and an object that can be recognized as 
different from the self. That this process is unconscious and part of the human psyche may have 
been part of Marx’s point in developing his model: if human beings could be made aware of the 
nature of the ‘power’ and ‘value’ of the fetishes that they themselves had made, perhaps they 
could come to change them. Again, it must be mentioned that this is, in the end, a conceptual 
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model, a tool for understanding society. In educating human beings as to the humanist Marxist 
position, people can use it as a method for deconstructing how social relations are set up, and 
determining what purposes, if any, a social structure has been assigned by the people living in a 
society. It is by no means perfect, and it is certainly a more complicated theoretical model than 
the determinist position, but it has its advantages, which I shall discuss in more detail shortly.  
For now, let us turn to human agency. Since we have discussed what it is that humanist 
Marxism thinks human agents do, I should discuss what humanist Marxism thinks human agency 
actually is in and of itself. 
IV. What is Agency? 
Human agency at the simplest level is the ability of human beings to choose their actions. 
Charles Taylor, though not a Marxist, provides a rather good definition of human agency in his 
Philosophical Papers: “To be a full human agent, to be a person, or a self in the ordinary 
meaning, is to exist in a space defined by distinctions of worth. A self is a being for whom 
certain questions of categoric value have arisen, and received at least partial answers.”283 Human 
agency, in Taylor’s argument, is the ability to make decisions based not simply on utilitarian 
principles of benefit/cost, but to distinguish between two different moral visions: any choice, he 
argues, is one between different versions of whom one wishes to be.284 Marxist humanism has, 
perhaps not surprisingly, a similar take on this basic concept, in that Marx saw human beings as 
essentially conscious, creative beings. The difference between the human animal and others was 
that human beings are able to form thoughts about the actions that they take. So, while the bees 
of a hive are equally capable of creating things of complexity, monkeys may use tools, human 
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beings are able to use their minds to envision the object they will make before they make it. In 
other words, at some basic level, there is a cognitive gap between humans and other animals in 
that we are able to plan out what we are going to do.285 Alienation, in some respects, can be seen 
as the natural result of societies in which human beings are not free to be conscious creators: 
their labour is not done by choice, but because it is necessary to society, and because they are 
forced to do so to survive. We are truly human when we are able to make choices that will define 
the objects we create with those actions, and in turn ourselves as a result of changes in our 
experience and minds that follow from those actions. Since our actions create an object that a 
person can recognize as different from ourselves, and against which we can define ourselves, 
every action that a person takes and everything that he or she creates redefines that person’s 
concept of themselves. They can identify themselves as x or y in relation to the objects, social 
structures, and people around them, and by their different actions, change both the definition of 
those other objects, people and themselves.  
This is the second aspect to human agency within Marxist humanism, one that is far more 
important here: the role that it plays within the dialectic. Recall that in the section on alienation, I 
discussed that human beings come to assign meaning and intrinsic value to the objects they 
perceive or that they create. How they go about doing this results in the creation of social 
structures. So on the one hand, there is the Marxist humanist argument about human beings as 
conscious creators, but the other side of the humanist position is that human beings’ actions and 
the manner in which they act to deal with alienation results in the changes in society that the 
dialectic proposes to trace. If human beings come to use money to represent a value for 
exchange, this takes on meaning in the society and, as human beings come to accept money’s 
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fetishistic value, as a social structure. So too with any other element within society, whether it is 
the state, the family, or religion.286 Marxist humanism accepts that these social structures help to 
define the beliefs and ‘roles’ of human beings in the society, but that humans in turn shape the 
society by their actions.287 So, taking again the example of money, if a person grows up in a 
market-society where money has a fetishistic value as we have thus far discussed, that person 
will be quite likely to accept that value in their own minds. But by doing so, and continuing to 
use money in the fashion of a fetish--by pursuing it as a goal in and of itself, by accepting, tacitly 
or not, the role of money in society--then he is contributing to the continuation and reinforcement 
of that fetish, and vice versa for actions that challenge it.  
The actions we take are seen in Marxist humanism to be a kind of continual feedback 
system, where the human beings in society conceptualize all kinds of objects, create them 
according to a division of labour, and fetishize the worth of those objects via the process of 
alienation. Social structures are created by human beings as ways of institutionalizing and/or 
legitimating the social relations that occur as a result of our actions and the alienation process. 
But they are only seen to have power so long as we continue to accept them. Many writers in the 
Marxist tradition, and outside it, have written on both the issue of agency and its role in social 
life. Many writers, both within humanist and determinist Marxism, have written on the concept 
of ‘voluntarism,’ or the need for human beings to act in order to realize the communist dream of 
revolutionary victory. I would like to examine the concept of voluntarism, very briefly, in order 
to fill out the concept of human agency described thus far.  
There are basically three ‘strains’ of voluntarism within Marxism. The first is the idea of 
spontaneous revolution, the second is that of planned revolution, and the third is democratic or 
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gradual reformism. The first is primarily found in Luxemburg, though others have made the 
argument as well. The second is found in both Lenin and Gramsci. Luxemburg, for example, 
argued that the eventual revolution against capitalism would be led by a spontaneous uprising of 
the entire working class.288 These uprisings would occur as a result and reaction to the crises that 
occurred in capitalism, once the workers were made aware of it. In a way, this variation of 
voluntarism is linked to the determinist Marxist tendency and, if at all linked to humanist 
Marxism, to the naturalistic position of Feuerbach. This is because it assumes that the movement 
of history will A) create a series of economically predetermined crises, and B) that the workers 
will play a specific role in acting to resolve the tensions created by these crises. On the one hand, 
Luxemburg’s spontaneous uprising would be an action on the part of the workers, but if that 
action is determined by the crises created by economic contradictions in a society, we are already 
veering strongly into a form of determinism. The position of Lenin, despite occasional lapses 
into determinism, also is one of the few occasions when voluntarism is linked with revolutionary 
uprising. Instead of a spontaneous action that results from the workers’ becoming conscious of 
tensions within capitalism that they must overcome, Lenin argued that the power of capitalist 
control over society required the continued guidance of a cadre of revolutionary professionals.289 
Since capitalism was so well organized, he believed that the only way that the socialist 
revolutionary movement could respond was to become equally well organized. While I hesitate 
to argue that there is an explicit link between the ideas, Lenin’s argument does come close to that 
of the humanist position I have thus far outlined: using the conceptual model of Marxism to 
understand the tensions and choices made within a society that have resulted in the accumulation 
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of wealth and power due to the division of labour, and making changes accordingly. Lastly, there 
is the concept of democratic reform, of which Kautsky stands as an example in his later life. 
Also, while Gramsci does not explicitly call it this, his argument is an example of something 
mid-way between the positions of Lenin and Kautsky. Kautsky argued that socialism had as its 
goal the emancipation of human beings from oppression of any sort, and that democratic reform 
was equally effective as revolution, especially given the strength of support for liberal 
democracy in the Western world.290 Similarly, Gramsci called for a Modern Prince (a political 
party) to lead the leftist movements in democratic Western countries in a “war of position,” 
where the goal would be piecemeal gains in opposition to the ruling class and its allies.291 The 
working class, in both men’s argument, had an active role to play in leading the drive for change 
in capitalist societies.  
If there is any problem with the voluntarism argument, it is that it drifts occasionally into, 
or takes some of its inspiration from, the determinist Marxist position, or, if on occasion it relies 
on humanist Marxist arguments, draws too heavily from Marx’s Feuerbachian writing. In other 
words, in all three variations of the voluntarist argument, there is a tendency to argue that the 
reason the working class will develop into a leadership role in the struggle against capitalism is 
because of the role that class plays in the structure of society. Their oppression and the structure 
of society can be seen as ‘forcing’ the working class into the role of revolutionaries, something 
that history has not borne out, and that denies the human agency at the core of the humanist 
Marxist position. Humanist Marxism is meant as a tool to help people understand the structure of 
society, and perhaps to act as a guide for action based upon the knowledge developed through its 
use. It is a choice on the part of the workers in that class, the political parties that purport to lead 
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them, and the Marxists who hope to guide them both, to see the world through the lens of 
Marxism or liberalism or any other political perspective. If a Marxist revolutionary or reformist 
position is to develop in society, it is not because the role the proletariat plays in society forces 
them or gives them special insight, it is because they are educated by people who believe in 
Marxism. Those people, in turn, have to choose to see through the lens of Marxism themselves. 
Marxism is as much a social structure as anything else, and Marx himself was, despite his 
continual poverty and debt, born and raised amongst the middle class! Anyone can come to see 
through the Marxist lens, although I will be the first to admit that someone who benefits from 
capitalism will, like the biblical allegory of the rich man and the eye of a needle, perhaps be less 
likely or happy to do so.292 
Human agency lies at the heart of humanist Marxism, in that it is the basis for both the 
conceptual model, and the goal of Marxism in the first place--to establish a society in which 
human beings have control over their own lives and the society in which they live. It is, certainly, 
a utopian ideal, and this is a criticism I shall field below, but it is nonetheless one of the key 
ideals to which Marxism adheres. Seeing as it is a conceptual model, and that it places agency at 
the forefront of the dialectical evolution of society, it is now appropriate that I provide a 
summary dialectical model of humanist Marxism. How does society evolve, and into what? And 
what, if anything, does humanist Marxism say of the prophetic hopes that determinism takes to 
such extremes? 
V. The Humanist Dialectic, Present and Future. 
How does society evolve? This question is answered by humanist Marxism with whatever the 
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people in that society choose. The answer may seem, at first, a bit simplistic, but it follows 
naturally from the humanist dialectical model. Marx, in his youth, still believed that the result of 
the dialectical process in capitalist society would be the radical transformation of capitalism into 
socialism. This, I believe, was in error, although the Feuerbachian version of humanist Marxism 
might accept that as a logical outcome. The humanist dialectical model I have tried to establish 
in this paper, however, does not propose a definitive end to the process of history. Instead, it is a 
conceptual model that allows the person who uses it to understand how society evolves, and 
perhaps, based upon that understanding, to act to change the world around her. But the dialectic 
is an examination of how the entire body of society acts, and the clear-headed person must 
realize that Marxists are, for all their effort, but one group amongst many. Their goals can and 
will be opposed by the members of other groups. Indeed, this follows from the nature of the 
dialectical method we have thus far seen. Humanist Marxism takes it as given that the structure 
of society results from the various actions of human agents within that society, regardless of how 
‘conscious’ or ‘aware’ they are of the results. Thus every human action within society helps to 
reinforce or challenge those various structures. A person who goes to the local supermarket 
every day for groceries, knowingly or not, is reinforcing the capitalist form of food production 
and the market economy. A person who instead chooses to buy from local producers who operate 
outside of the corporate market might be helping to swing the pendulum away from capitalism 
towards something different--socialism is but one of many such alternatives. 
The point of this should be readily apparent: there is, as Camus once put it, no real end to 
that process which dialectical models analyze.293 If it has an end then it is not really a dialectical 
model at all. Recall that in the determinist chapter, I briefly mentioned the work of Melvin 
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Rader, who proposed that Marx had three variations on his analysis: one was the now famous 
base-superstructure model, another was a more organic, but still determinist model, and the third 
was the early Marx’s Hegelian dialectic.294 Hegel’s model was one in which the entirety of the 
dialectical process was engaged in continual change and evolution as its various parts interacted. 
This process involved the conflict between antagonistic elements where one part or another 
would achieve a form of victory over its antithesis. The result was a change in the thing being 
analyzed by the dialectic, but this change was the result of new tensions and conflicts emerging 
as a result of the synthesis of the old antagonisms.295 Similarly, Marx’s early model of the 
dialectic assumed that the antagonisms between classes--made up of agents with varying degrees 
of power and control over the economy and other parts of the society-- would help define the 
structure of the whole society. The manner in which human beings acted to resolve the conflict 
over scarce resources, and the power imbalances these actions created, would result in the way a 
society was set up. The conflict between these various parts would result in changes in that 
society, which he assumed would be revolutionary. But these transformations cannot be 
absolutely deterministic: the changes that result from different degrees of ownership and power 
simply create a new type of social order, to which the dialectical model still applies. The 
humanist Marxist dialectic, recall, is a conceptual one: it only measures the changes that have 
occurred, pointing out the potential results of human action and the manner in which society is 
organized. A change in the society being studied simply means that, like any other tool, one must 
re-calibrate one’s instruments and see what has changed, not that the end of the dialectic or the 
process of history is already written. Indeed, to suggest that, because the dialectical model 
suggests x and therefore x will happen, is a lot like suggesting that the only reason why the 
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revolutionary prophecy of Marxism has failed to be realized is because we Marxists have to get 
the formula right in order for reality to follow suit.  
The Marxist dialectical model, then, is a method for analyzing the way that human 
actions have shaped society, and why a society takes a certain form. It arrives at this by 
analyzing the actions of human agents within the given society, and may be able to suggest 
possible results if certain actions are taken by the members of society--including the dialectical 
thinker in question. Human agency is defined as the ability of human beings to make conscious 
choices between different goals/morals/actions and to make choices in general. The human 
agents within society act as parts in a complex social whole, whose choices are a reaction to the 
material conditions they face, the pressures they feel from the actions of other human beings (and 
the structures they make), and the alienation that they experience in the division of themselves 
from the objects around them. Let us define these three elements a bit more fully within the 
context of the dialectic. 
First, human beings live in various conditions: in one area, food is scarce, where in 
another it is abundant. Marxism argues that human beings are inherently social creatures, and so, 
given the various conditions they face, human beings react to these conditions with varying 
forms of production necessary to their survival with various social structures. One of these is the 
economy, which humanist Marxism sees as the manner in which human beings provide 
necessities for themselves in a society. It is not my intention to suggest here that humans 
consciously plan out every single detail of their economic lives. Instead, the economy is the 
result of a series of choices made by human beings within a society--to farm wheat instead of 
rice, to produce clothing by industrial machinery as opposed to by hand, and so on. These 
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choices are often made as the result of both groups and individuals making decisions based upon 
the tools they have at hand and the options they see available to them. The grain farmer may 
believe there is economic advantage in producing grain instead of rice, or perhaps the soil does 
not favour the latter, or perhaps she has better tools for harvesting grain than rice. These and 
thousands of similar everyday actions by human beings create the economic structure of a 
society, and change it over time. Human beings create new tools, react to changes in the 
environment, and come up with new ways to resolve their needs in society: the actions that they 
take in these and other situations change the structures of the economy, and the rest of society. 
It should be readily apparent this is related to the second pressure I mentioned above, that 
of the actions of other human beings and the social structures that result from such actions. In 
any given society, the choices human beings make about how to govern themselves result in the 
creation of social structures. These structures are seen in humanist Marxism as being the 
collective results of thousands of human actions. The state, for example, in any society, is the 
result of thousands of human beings developing rules by which people shall act in that society, 
and those to enforce and reinterpret those rules over time. Education arises because human 
beings see the need to teach their youths. And philosophy and religion arise as natural reactions 
of humanity to its fears and hopes of the afterlife, the meaning of this life, and so forth. Unlike 
determinist Marxism, though, humanist Marxism sees these structures for what they are: the 
result of human activity. That social structures accumulate power is both partly a form of 
alienation and a result of those actions that created them in the first place. On the one hand, 
human beings come, over time, to associate power and meaning to the structures they themselves 
have created in addition to the actual purpose (whatever that may be) of those structures. On the 






people come to accept given structures as a legitimate manner of performing a given function in 
society. Human beings also often provide those who act within those structures--priests in 
religion, teachers in education, and bureaucrats in the state--with the power necessary to act 
within a given role. These structures, in turn, act upon the various members of society as a result 
of the choices made by the people within those structures. The leadership of a church outlaws 
gay marriage, for example, and this action has a tangible effect as the weight of that church 
group is brought to bear against gays within a society. Again, these structures are the result of 
human action, and how they are used and changed over time depends a great deal on how human 
beings choose to use them. 
This relates to the third element I have identified as being a part of the dialectical model 
of humanist Marxism: alienation. Human beings give the very things they create a meaning and 
power that is divorced from creation of those things in the first place. So, for example, the state, 
originally a series of rules and offices for enforcers of those rules, comes to have a grander 
meaning in and of itself. Instead of seeing its role as a enforcer of the rules of society, the state is 
seen as being the sole legitimate power in society, the place where one goes to flex one’s social 
muscles, and the site of power and agency for the whole country in its dealings with the rest of 
the world. How human beings react to this new meaning of the state creates more social 
structures: lobby groups emerge in democratic states, or uprisings occur in autocracies like 
Russia, ad infinitum. Marxist humanism sees this as one other way in which societies evolve 
over time: human beings create new forms of alienated meaning, and often find themselves in 
conflict over the division of power within society between the various social structures they have 
created. Marx’s model was, perhaps, an attempt to make human beings aware of this alienation, 






and political structures over which they rapidly ceased to have control thanks to the division of 
power and authority in the society and due in no small part to the organization of the social 
structures in question.  
Human actions change society and social structures over time, as I had mentioned above. 
If a society’s economic structure is capitalist, the choice to continue using the massive, 
corporate-owned grocery store down the street is as much a force for preserving society in one 
form as is the larger choice by the government (and the agents within it) to maintain the freedom 
of the economy. Actions that oppose the social structures human beings have created have an 
effect on transforming them in ways both subtle and overt: burning down a church has an 
obvious and immediate impact, whereas protests against the state may result in gradual changes 
to the state’s policy over time. In the end, however, the humanist Marxist version of the dialectic 
is one which sees the whole of society made up of many human agents with varying degrees of 
power and influence: any number of choices made by the various members of society have an 
impact on the rest of society in some way or another, creating a change in the whole of the social 
system. This can lead to a new society--communism instead of capitalism, for example--or it 
may simply mean that the society re-organizes certain elements within itself as a result of the 
choices made by the people within it--welfare emerges as a manner of dealing with 
unemployment and the poverty of the working class in capitalism. This, then, is the humanist 
dialectic: one that sees social changes occurring over time as the result of the choices. These 
choices can be made conscious of the effects on society--perhaps Marxism can assist human 
beings to become conscious of those effects: however, the choice to cease going to the superstore 
mentioned earlier may be because one actively opposes corporate capitalism (one is conscious of 






specific product that is not available at the superstore (one is unconscious/uncaring of the impact 
of their actions in society). Given enough of such choices over time, the various structures 
affected by those choices change over time, and change the whole of society as well. Humanist 
Marxism can, from this basis, make arguments as to the effects of such activities by human 
beings, and perhaps make modest predictive models. It can also be used to explain what role a 
given structure plays in society, or what the effect of various actions by human beings in the past 
has been.  
But it is a far cry from this to suggest that the answers we derive from using the humanist 
Marxist method are going to provide us with definitively accurate prophecies, and indeed such a 
faith in prophecy goes completely contrary to the nature of humanist Marxism. If the actions of 
human agents determine the way society is structured, then those choices may certainly be 
measured to some degree. But these actions do not remove the society from the dialectic, as 
determinist Marxism suggests will happen at the ‘end of history’ in the communist utopia. 
Instead, these actions simply create changes that, once again, can be measured with the dialectic. 
And since it is the action of human beings that determines the outcome of the dialectic, the only 
way that the process of history is going to follow a given path is if human beings choose to make 
that outcome happen. Even then, the outcome is not determined due to the fact that other human 
beings will make choices that oppose that outcome. The humanist dialectic does not and can not 
guarantee a given outcome to the tensions it detects within a society: it can only suggest possible 
outcomes and possible causes. For science, that is usually the best that anyone can come up with, 
and it is truly unfortunate that Marx, and later the Marxists, tended to abandon healthy 
scepticism in favour of a determinist model that promised their cause victory with a faith 






What happened to cause this change, of course, is open to interpretation. That there was 
an epistemological break in Marx’s writings around the time of 1844-1845 is readily apparent, 
despite the occasional scholarly dispute about exactly when or with what writing it occurred. The 
epistemological break I refer to here is the sudden change in Marx’s writing from his Hegelian 
early writings towards the later, determinist model. In short, he exchanged the conceptual 
humanist model for one that argued that it was the ownership of the economy, and the structure 
of the society itself--its internal contradictions and the class struggle that resulted--that 
determined the manner in which that society evolved. After this break, Marx would only 
infrequently return to and use the themes of the humanist model. At times, he blended alienation 
into the later model--in Volume Three of Capital, for instance, where fetishistic alienation makes 
a sudden return in his analysis of commodities, or the Grundrisse, where Marx toys with 
introducing Hegelian concepts like alienation and agency into his later economic model. But the 
emphasis had largely shifted towards determinism, and the fact that most of his early works 
remained unpublished until the early and mid-20
th
 Century, combined with the suppression of 
alternatives to Stalin and Soviet Diamat, prevented humanist Marxism from emerging in any real 
sense until after Stalin’s death. Even then, humanist Marxism has been often vilified by 
determinists as a kind of poor cousin, a return to Bernstein’s reformist tendencies, or as bad 
science. The latter accusation, in particular, seems rather odd given determinism’s blind faith in 
its own prophecies. The problem Marxism faces in the modern day is the struggle of its theorists 
to determine what the core of the theory is: determinism or humanism. It is my hope to show that 
humanist Marxism, despite its flaws, is the better model of the two, and the one to which 
Marxism should now turn in the present as its own. 






consider humanist Marxism to be the preferred model of Marx’s theory? Part of my answer is 
that humanist Marxism escapes the flaws of determinism, as I shall outline in the next section. In 
addition to this, however, I argue that humanist Marxism allows Marxism to analyze social 
change in a more effective fashion, and allows for a more meaningful praxis than does 
determinist Marxism. Both strands of Marxism claim to analyze social change, however, I have 
already demonstrated several flaws which I believe make determinist Marxist analysis 
incoherent. Humanist Marxism can be a useful tool for both philosophical and empirical 
analysis. On the one hand, it does not fall prey to the logical fallacies of determinism (the 
tautological issue, and the problem of agency), while still providing a model that may be 
applicable to several contexts. I do not wish to suggest here that humanist Marxism claims to be 
universally true. Instead, the model can be seen as being a method for understanding how it is 
that structures in many societies have evolved over time due to class conflict and the choices 
made by human beings over time in that conflict. Humanism may very well miss some other 
factors, but in arguing that it is the choices made by agents within a given society, it certainly 
allows Marxism to analyze a large number of social structures and potential causes for their 
development--is the state organized to control racial tension, to control a specific gender 
(women), to impose class dominance, etc. Humanist Marxism also allows for more flexibility in 
this sort of analysis: instead of arguing that everything is the result of internal, class-based 
contradictions within society (and thus arguing for some sort of absolute, universally true 
constant) humanist Marxism argues that societies evolve in a given context as a result of human 
choices. It allows the analyst to demonstrate why it is that various societies evolved in different 
ways due to the choices made in a given context.  It also provides, as I mentioned, a more 






crises, and therefore revolution, will emerge in a society due to internal contradictions or 
economic necessity. Thus any action that a person takes is irrelevant: it inevitably contributes in 
some way or another towards the end of a social order. Frankly, this is both bad logic and bad for 
political organization. On the one hand, actions that fortify the current social order may very well 
curtail revolution and change, and may make the “inevitable” transformation of society much 
more evitable. On the other hand, the argument that utopia is inevitable (whether that utopia is 
religious afterlife or communist society) is a double-edged sword. It may work to convert some, 
and to provide something on which people may hold in difficult times, but it also makes human 
action inconsequential: why bother acting if the end is already written? 
Instead, humanist Marxism argues that every human action is significant because it either 
contributes to or challenges the current social order. Why should this matter? It provides 
Marxists with a powerful argument as to why people should continue to act in the name of 
socialism, reform, and political change. If every human action is significant, then becoming 
aware of how one’s actions affect the society around him or her becomes incredibly important, as 
does acting consciously to make positive change. Our earlier example of the choice of grocery 
store will help to make this somewhat more clear. If the revolutionary transformation of society 
is inevitable, then surely it would not matter where one buys one’s groceries, or, for that matter, 
what anyone does at all, since the collapse of capitalism is already assured. If it is a matter of 
choice, then choosing what sort of grocery store one prefers--corporate superstore or local, 
worker’s collectives, for example--becomes incredibly important. Humanist Marxist political 
programmes demand conscious change on the part of its followers, not blind adherence to 
utopian ideals. It therefore has something very practical to bring to the Marxist political cause: a 






No normative disagreement can be wholly resolved by argument, and there is an element 
of a normative difference between humanism and determinism in Marxism. Both believe in 
fundamentally opposed models as to what causes social change. It is my argument, however, that 
the determinist model is logically incoherent, has been proven wrong many times in its analysis 
and predictions, and lacks political capital. If Marxism is to continue to be used as a political tool 
and philosophical model, I do not believe that the determinist model can be accepted any longer. 
It remains for me to defend humanism as best as I am able against potential criticisms, in order to 
demonstrate that it stands on its own merits. Let us turn to this project now. 
VI. An Essay in Self-Criticism: Flaws of Humanism? 
Recalling my criticisms of determinism in the last chapter, I argued that determinism had three 
problems: that it ignored agency to its own detriment, lacked historical veracity, and was 
tautological and non-testable. Let us review how well humanist Marxism answers these 
concerns. To the first concern, that of agency, the trouble now is that the argument is largely 
reversed: instead of structures or the economy causing every change in society, humanism argues 
that human beings within the society cause the changes in a society. So, how well does 
humanism deal with social structures? Humanism argues that human beings act to create social 
change, and create changes in social structures. The difference between the two versions of 
Marxism, however, is that humanism accepts the presence of social structures: it simply sees 
them for what they are. Social structures, within humanist Marxism, are seen as the result of 
numerous decisions made by groups of human beings within society, and these structures are still 
granted a modicum of autonomy in humanism, in that human beings, by their actions, use, 
reinforce, or challenge various social structures. The power of social structures is acknowledged 






of people within society that use and accept those social structures, they are granted a form of 
power. That human agents remain central is clear, and this strikes me as far more logical a 
proposition than to suggest that social structures have a form of arbitrary power divorced from 
the human beings whose actions allow the structures to exist in the first place! 
As to historical veracity, humanist Marxism, as I have already mentioned in this chapter, 
suffers from the fact that it was never worked out in any full format by Marx himself, and few 
Marxists have really used the humanist model since his death. I have pointed out a few 
exceptions above but few Marxist humanists have made any predictions. Indeed, much of 
humanist Marxism’s history has been a struggle to denounce the determinist position and 
establish itself as a legitimate alternative for Marxism. Kolakowski’s Main Currents of Marxism 
is a thorough examination of the various writings of Marxist thinkers, and he demonstrates this 
point rather well. Most humanist Marxism, when it has emerged, has been a reaction to more 
dogmatic and frequently determinist positions--Gramsci and Kautsky’s voluntarism in opposition 
to Stalinism, Miliband’s rejection of structuralism, or the Yugoslavian humanists under Tito, for 
example. He argues in his conclusion that Marxism has failed as a political programme, and that 
while some of its contributions to human knowledge have become accepted generally, it has little 
more to offer analytically or otherwise.296 That I disagree on the latter point is, I hope, quite 
apparent, but I will endeavour to present a brief argument on why this is so in the final chapter 
and to what remains for the Marxist political programme.  
However, with regards to historical veracity, the humanist Marxist perspective, if it is 
‘true’ to its own logical precepts, would likely be more than a bit tentative about any predictions 
it makes. Humanist Marxism does hope for socialism, as Miliband and others like him have 
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mentioned.297 However, accepting the humanist position leads me to argue that socialism is but 
one of many alternatives that may result from human activity within a society. Other alternative 
social systems are quite possible as well. Until a Marxist predictive hypothesis is put forward 
that takes the humanist position forward as its theoretical basis, its veracity will be more than a 
bit difficult to judge. Admittedly, both determinist and humanist Marxism have been reasonably 
decent at demonstrating how it is that societies have come to be as they are: various groups 
within society come to have more power and wealth and come to dominate society. This is, to be 
honest, not that surprising a conclusion. For an argument that claims to have some degree of 
analytical veracity, humanist Marxism has yet to have an opportunity to prove itself, while 
determinism has already been demonstrated to be inaccurate in its predictions.  
The issue that relates to this is whether or not the humanist position is tautological: can it 
be tested in the first place, or does it make an argument that is true by dint of its own logical 
precepts? That humanist Marxism makes a claim to being a conceptual model makes it 
inherently more open to being used as a serious hypothesis to be tested. Instead of a form of faith 
in the inevitability of its own success, Marxism seeks to examine how it is that society evolves 
and where it might go. As such, it is certainly testable. But is the humanist argument 
tautological? My argument here is that it is not. There is a difference between determinism and 
humanism in that determinism argues that the economy is both the cause of social change and the 
result of it: the economy causes social change, and a new economic form is the result. The 
humanist argument however is that human agents act on the economy and other social structures. 
The results of human actions are not ‘new human agents’ (unless the structure is, perhaps, 
reproductive processes) but new social structures. Thus the argument is not assumed to be true 







by its own precepts: the results of human actions may be hypothesized, but whether that 
hypothesis is true or not can be tested. Even if humanism did not have some degree of historical 
veracity or if it failed to take structures (the other side of the debate, here) into account, that it 
succeeds in avoiding the trap of tautology at the very least prevents it from being invalid from 
the start. For all determinism’s strengths, it fails to solve this third problem, while humanism, 
despite the flaws from which it may suffer, is not subject to determinism’s failings. It can be 
tested over time, and as such, is certainly a more appropriate position for Marxists to take. 
Determinist Marxists might complain, however, that the humanist perspective lacks 
determinism’s political ‘weight,’ and that my contention that determinism is politically bankrupt 
is incorrect. Such claims, given the history of determinist Marxist politics--Stalin is an obvious 
example--and that determinism has been promising a revolution and communist utopia for over a 
hundred years and not delivering, is in somewhat bad taste. That said, let us consider the issue, 
briefly: humanist Marxism argues that human choice is the cause of social change. As such 
Marxism’s political goal of socialism requires, in the humanist perspective, only that people 
continue to challenge social inequality and become conscious of the effects of their actions on 
the organization of society. It certainly has a political future given that exploitation, oppression, 
and a host of other evils continue to plague humanity, and humanist Marxism therefore provides 
a tool for understanding how one’s actions affect society and can perhaps help resolve some of 
those evils. As such, humanist Marxism has something quite powerful to offer to Marxist 
political action: a call to action, and a perspective from which people can come to see why it is 
necessary to act. 
VIII. Conclusion 
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It has been my goal in this chapter to present humanism as honestly as possible as an alternative 
interpretation to determinism in the history of Marxist ideas. I have attempted to argue that there 
is a reasonably significant difference between these two models, and to differentiate between the 
humanist Marxism of Marx’s interpretation of Feuerbach and that of some of his other early 
writings. I have endeavoured to define the non-Feuerbachian humanist Marxist position, 
including its interpretation of alienation and its contention that human agency is what drives 
social evolution. Lastly, I defended the humanist Marxist position as best as I could from the 
similar criticisms I levelled against determinism. In the final chapter, then, I shall turn to 
potential criticisms of my overall argument, and endeavour to dispel them, and will offer some 







Chapter Five: Concluding Remarks 
I. Outline 
 
In this final chapter I will be doing two things: attempting to defend my interpretation of 
humanist Marxism from potential criticisms of my argument; and summing up the argument I 
have made in this paper with some concluding remarks. The former task is different from the 
task I undertook in Chapter Four, in that in the chapter on humanist Marxism I sought merely to 
defend my definition of humanist Marxism from the criticisms I had levelled against 
determinism. Here, however, my goal is to bring up potential criticisms of my argument on the 
whole, and demonstrate that it stands against these potential critiques. I will then wrap up this 
project with some final comments, and hopefully in so doing provide the reader with a sense of 
what Marxism can take from the present paper and its conclusions. This is largely speculation on 
my own part, as I will mostly venture commentary on what I feel the implications of this paper 
on Marxist theory and practice may be. Without further ado, then, let us turn to the first project, 
defending myself from potential criticism. 
II. A Final Essay in Self-Criticism: Theory and Interpretation 
The reader may recall that, in my introductory chapter on the purpose of, and methodology used, 
in this paper, I had put forward the goal of this paper as being an examination of what it was that 
the dialectic meant to Marxists. I then endeavoured to show, both in that first and in subsequent 
chapters, that such a question invariably leads into a discussion of the different forms of the 
dialectic within Marxism. In my case, I argued that the difference between various Marxist 
dialectical models could be linked to determinism and humanism within Marx’s own writing, 






between these two models of Marxism, and provide an argument as to why humanist Marxism 
might be preferred over its determinist counterpart. We will see, first, how well I have 
accomplished this task. 
In short, I believe that I have succeeded in presenting the two sides of Marxism as clearly 
as possible. I have argued why it is that humanist Marxism is preferable, and what this may mean 
for Marxism. Yet there is potentially a problem, one which relates to my research methodology. 
In my introductory chapter I had presented my methodology as being based largely upon 
Skinner’s contextualist approach, and to a lesser degree that of Gadamer. I rejected Strauss’s 
concept of ‘the tradition,’ and sought to avoid the potential for both reading in meaning to texts 
where there is none, and for presenting the texts of writer as having a coherency that may not 
exist. From this latter part of the chapter, I can see the following potential criticisms of my 
argument: 1) the choice of humanism/determinism as terms in my argument; 2) the presentation 
of the texts throughout as presenting a tradition of sorts within Marxism, and/or that I may have 
left out important or contradictory theories 3) that the present paper argues in favour of a “more 
true” Marx--the humanist one; 4) the problem of deriving a coherent humanist or determinist 
Marxism from the texts I have analyzed here; and 5) that I may have created a false dichotomy. 
These criticisms largely stem from political theory and the problems of interpretation, and must 
be resolved in some sense in this paper if its argument is to be successful. Let us now see how 
we fare with each. 
II.A. Choice of Terms 
There is always the potential for problems when one uses a given set of terms. In this case, the 
choice made in this paper to use humanist and determinist as definitions of two different forms of 






different meanings, certainly. There is the classical humanism of the Greeks, that of the 
Renaissance, and that of a host of other political and philosophical positions throughout the 
history of ideas. Similarly, determinism is often affiliated more with religious issues, and 
specifically, is often used in the context of the debate over whether human beings can have free 
will in a universe inhabited by an omnipotent/omniscient deity. My intent, of course, was not to 
drag any of these other theoretical positions into the paper. I selected the terms humanist and 
determinist largely because the former implied a connection to, or concern with, human beings, 
while the latter is associated with the idea that something or someone (mortal or divine) is 
responsible for the events of the real world. Since the early Marx’s writings largely revolved, as I 
have argued, around human agency within a social context, I felt the term humanist was 
appropriate as a form of label for his works--and those of later Marxists--who accepted human 
agency as central to their theoretical models. Since the later writings of Marx often assumed that 
economics, or other social structures, were the determinant factor of social change and 
formation, I selected determinism as a label for that particular brand of Marxism. There, I admit, 
the religious meaning may have somewhat of a role to play: like religious beliefs, the determinist 
Marxist strain believes that some agency external to that of human beings is responsible for all of 
history. In short, however, my argument uses these terms loosely, and in so doing I am not 
seeking by any means to argue that Marx was a member of a larger, humanist or determinist, 
philosophical or religious movement. While I do not doubt that such an argument is quite 
possible to make, in my case, the terms I have used were out of convenience and a desire to 
distinguish the differences between the two strands of Marxism. 
II.B. The Problem of Tradition 






argued, as have others, that the idea that there is a grand tradition/canon within political theory 
may make it easier to organize teaching on the subject, but it may lead the student of the history 
of ideas to feel, incorrectly, that writers were consciously writing to each other throughout the 
ages. I bring this issue up here because one potential criticism of my own argument is that I may 
have posited the idea of a humanist and determinist set of traditions within Marxism itself. 
Certainly, my review of the literature lends itself to this to some degree: I largely analyzed the 
canon of Marxist thought including, for example Lenin, Luxemburg, and Marx and Engels. 
There are, I admit, many Marxist writers both past and present whom I have chosen not to 
include in my survey of the literature, and in my argument. Largely this is a function of the time 
and space available to me: a thesis at the Master of Arts level grants me a great deal of space to 
work with, but does not afford me the space to include everything. I will discuss this in more 
depth in a moment.  
More importantly, however, is the issue of the tradition. I do accept, to some extent, that 
Marxist writers have been writing to and/or responding to each other over the course of the 
history of Marxist ideas. However, unlike the ‘Grand Tradition’ of Strauss, I accept this with 
legitimate cause: Marxist writers have often explicitly been writing about past thinkers and 
replying to and/or updating the works of the past to the modern day. Indeed, much of Marxist 
literature can be seen as a long and arduous battle to keep Marx’s own writing relevant to the 
context of later writers. I would, however, also argue that my use of a concept of a humanist and 
determinist set of traditions in this paper is more akin to Kuhn’s paradigms: two opposing 
models that explain phenomena to be studied by a discipline. Marxism, itself, is but one 
paradigm within the fields of economics, political science, and philosophy. The two schools I 






While I have generally sought to avoid using language like ‘the tradition of Marxism,’ or similar 
statements, if there is a tacit acceptance in my paper of such an idea, it is in this latter form, and 
not in the sense of a ‘Grand Tradition’ or a historical debate such as in the Straussian argument. 
As mentioned earlier, another and related criticism for this paper is that have left out 
other writers within the Marxist school of thought. This is, however, conscious on my part. As I 
had mentioned, there is a limit on the space and time that I have had to prepare and write this 
project. While my original plan was to include writers from the modern day, I was inevitably 
forced by time constraints to leave them out. There may well be similar arguments made within 
the body of Marxist literature, and there are likely some more recent writers who make 
arguments to which I might have referred. In this, I must apologize, however, I maintain that my 
argument still stands given the literature I have presented. My understanding of modern Marxism 
leads me to the conclusion that there has not been much debate on this particular issue. I hope 
with this paper to have begun such discussion. 
II.C The One True Path to Enlightenment 
A more compelling criticism of my argument might be arguing that I am positing in some sense 
a Marxist perspective that is ‘more true’ to Marx than others. This is particularly important in 
political theory, as it is often difficult to determine what an author, long dead, truly meant. It is, 
of course, possible that I have erred in my analysis and my interpretation of the texts presented in 
this paper. To the charge of potential inaccuracy I can only contend that I have tried to be as 
accurate as possible, and I am open to the possibility that I may be wrong. I have, throughout this 
paper, endeavoured to present the literature I have used in as compete a fashion as possible. I 
have also endeavoured to let these texts ‘speak for themselves,’ that is, to present a writer’s 






argument of each writer as if I believed it to be true. I have done this so as to provide a fair 
assessment and a summary of the works of various authors that is neither taxing on the reader’s 
patience, nor contradictory to that writer’s own arguments. That I am critical of many of the 
writers I have presented is readily apparent, but this is not the same as misrepresentation. 
 As for whether or not there is a Marxism that is ‘true’ to Marx’s own writing, such a 
position is open for debate. Most scholars in political theory and particularly the history of ideas 
will be quite quick to point out that any act of interpretation is exactly that: an interpretation. I 
have endeavoured to avoid positing that humanist Marxism is ‘more true’ than determinism, and 
instead to present both sides as fully as possible. Many Marxists would, I hope, be hesitant to 
argue that there is one true version of their theory, given Marxism’s emphasis on the differences 
that occur in various given social contexts. My argument, instead, is that humanist Marxism 
stands up more effectively than does determinist Marxism to the criticisms I have presented thus 
far. It is on this basis alone that I have condemned determinist Marxism and chosen to argue in 
favour of humanist Marxism. To be frank, then, whether or not humanism could be called a truer 
Marxism is entirely irrelevant: simply put, it is my contention that it works and can provide a 
more compelling theoretical and analytical model, while determinist Marxism does neither. I 
have no interest whatsoever in a debate on what is to be considered the ‘one, true Marxism,’ for 
such a debate has only the potential to lead into the sort of dogmatism that Marx himself would 
have, and did, condemn and which I abhor. 
II.D The Problem of Coherence 
A related element to the issue of a true or ‘more accurate’ reading of Marx is the issue of 
coherence. One might accuse this paper of seeing coherency in Marx’s early works, or imposing 






a fair criticism: I freely admitted in Chapter Four that much of the problem with the humanist 
Marxist interpretation is that it was not, by any means, given as much detail by Marx as his later 
model. Similarly, much of humanist Marxist writing since Marx has been an attempt to denounce 
the determinist approach and establish itself as an alternative. To some degree, this paper is a 
current example of the latter trend. If there is no coherency in what Marx wrote, however, upon 
what am I basing my interpretation of Marx? For the most part, my argument has attempted to 
find the humanist Marxist element in writings that were either: A) written before the 
epistemological break of 1844-1845, and thus in the category of his early works; and B) those 
early works that take a non-ontological view of the dialectical model being developed. Marx 
often wrote that his argument reflected the real world, and there are several points throughout his 
writing career where he points out that the dialectic is meant to examine the way human beings 
interact with the objects around them. It is this latter, epistemological interpretation of Marx that 
I have endeavoured to flesh out here. Certainly, the charge that I have imposed some clarification 
on Marx’s writing is appropriate: I have had to find writings that took the humanist view I 
wished to establish, separate them from Marx’s Feuerbachian writings and his later writings, and 
present the argument, however limited, with which I was left. Most of what I have gleaned from 
Marx, and from later Marxists, however, is actually written within his and their writings. The 
only ‘clarification’ I have made is to present it as being all of one piece--for example, I include 
all of the young Marx’s writing in a single section in the second chapter. I will admit to this, but 
to present a common theme or argument in my paper is not the same as to suggest that Marx was 
more clear than he actually was. Instead, I have simply attempted to show some of the arguments 
Marx and others made over the course of their careers, and to differentiate between various 






II.E. The False Dichotomy? 
Finally, it could be argued that in presenting the humanist and determinist Marxist arguments as I 
have done, I have perhaps created a false dichotomy. In the manner I have presented the two 
sides, I have certainly taken pains to show how the two arguments are opposed to each other, but 
one might be concerned that either: A) the two ‘sides’ do not in fact exist, or that B) I have left 
out other potential versions of Marxism. To the former, I think the argument has already been 
made reasonably clearly in this paper, but it is my position that these two variations of Marxism 
exist, and are almost entirely incommensurable (Marx was, I think, more successful than others 
at blending the two in some of his later works). I have taken pains to show evidence from various 
Marxist writers whose arguments are clearly on one side or another of a large epistemological 
gulf: some see the cause of social change over the course of history as being caused by human 
agency, the other sees it as part of the internal structural contradictions of societies. The former 
sees its own argument largely as epistemological, or as presenting an interpretation of how 
human beings understand the world. The latter largely argues, with a few exceptions, that it is an 
accurate ontological description of reality. To my mind, the dichotomy exists rather clearly 
within Marxism.  
Let us then examine the second criticism: that I have, in emphasizing determinism vs. 
humanism, left out other potential interpretations. For example, the case of Marx himself is 
rather ambiguous. At many points throughout his life he seemed to prevaricate between the 
humanist and determinist perspectives. Similarly, there have been other interpretations of 
Marxism, which I have touched on, such as voluntarism, reformism, or ‘trade-unionism,’ and so 
on. However, my primary contention in this paper has been that there is a fundamental conflict 






perspectives: those who argue that human agents cause changes in history, and those who think 
that society’s own structure/the economy causes changes in history. While perhaps my grouping 
of various Marxists can be changed a little--some might argue Luxemburg is more of a humanist 
or that Miliband has elements of determinism in his argument--I argue that the division between 
humanist and determinist Marxism is fundamental: one can accept only one or the other as true 
in one’s argument, not both. Thus while there are, and have been, other interpretations of Marx’s 
theory, almost anyone writing from a Marxist perspective has to, at some point, take sides on this 
issue, whether explicitly or not. It has been my goal in this paper to establish the differences 
between these two sides, and demonstrate that the humanist perspective, however flawed, is still 
superior to the determinist model. Marxists should therefore be careful in how they structure 
their arguments so as to avoid falling into the trap of the latter model. 
III. Final Remarks 
It would now be appropriate for me to conclude the project with some final remarks. I have, in 
this paper, argued two major points: that there is a difference between the determinist and 
humanist models of Marxism, as I have outlined in previous chapters; and that based upon the 
assessment of those two models, the humanist model stands as a stronger argument upon which 
to stand. I also argued that the humanist model provides Marxism with a more compelling 
political stance. Let us review these ideas, one last time, here. First, I originally asked the 
question “what is the Marxist dialectic?” I concluded that, upon review, there were two forms of 
dialectic: the humanist and the determinist models within Marxism. I therefore set out to 
examine these two concepts in more depth, and to determine which was more useful for Marxist 
theory. The determinist model, I argued, was based upon the idea that social structures of various 






structures are, by their very design, seen as being full of contradictions as a result of the class 
conflict in a society. Various social structures are built to contain the conflict over resources 
between classes in society, but end up creating further conflict as a result of the division of 
power and labour that they create in turn. This leads to revolutionary change. I argued that this 
position was incapable of dealing with three criticisms: that it failed to take agency into account, 
that it had been largely falsified by history, and that it was tautological. From there, I began to 
build a case for humanist Marxism, arguing that it was a conception of the dialectic that held the 
actions of human agents as being responsible for social change. It was largely a conceptual 
model, that is, a tool for comprehending how it is that the actions human beings take result in 
objects being created and moving beyond the control of their creators. I argued that it saw power 
relations in society being the result of the actions of collective groups of human agents. I also 
argued that, unlike determinism, the humanist model holds up to the three earlier criticisms: it 
takes structures into account as well as agents, and it has the opportunity to make testable 
hypotheses that may yield accurate results--as it has largely been untested up to this point, the 
question of veracity has yet to be fully examined. 
The point of this project, then, has been to establish a new model of Marxism, based on 
the oldest model of Marx’s writing we have--that of his writings when he was a young man. 
There are elements of determinism even here, in the form of his association with Feuerbach’s 
form of naturalistic arguments. Feuerbach’s position, while closer to the humanist perspective, 
still argued that the position it took was closer to ontological truth than an epistemological 
perspective. I endeavoured to differentiate between this Feuerbachian position and that of the 
humanist Marx. This latter position may also be seen as being closer to Hegel’s model than that 






early and later writings to denounce Hegel’s ‘idealism’ in favour of a study of human beings in 
the real world. I also tried to demonstrate that there are those who have adopted humanism in the 
course of the history of ideas from within the Marxist theoretical perspective, and that it is to this 
humanist position Marxism must now turn for inspiration in the future. While it is not the focus 
of this paper, it is certainly no accident to my mind that the determinist position led into the 
arguments of VI Lenin and, later, Joseph Stalin, that there could be a one, true, Marxism, and 
that to deviate from this perspective would be to commit the highest heresy. That it has been 
proven wrong by history is bad enough--at some point, one must throw out a theory if it is 
proven wrong by facts--but that one of the greatest examples of determinism was the dialectical 
model in use by the Soviet Union and was used as justification for the crimes of its leaders 
should give Marxists pause. This is not, by any means, to suggest that a dialectical theory can be 
blamed for the tragedies of the real world, but it is not far off to suggest that it played a part in 
giving Stalin and the Soviets a dogma upon which they could fall back when dissent arose.  
Does humanist Marxism, then, offer us a way out of this trap? I argue that it does. One 
the one hand, as a theoretical perspective it does not fall prey to the errors of determinist 
Marxism. On the other hand, however, is that humanist Marxism argues two key points that 
Marxists must continue to take into account: that it is human beings that make their society, and 
that it is the goal of Marxism to ensure that all human beings are able to make the choices that 
they wish without oppression or exploitation. As such, this gives us two important points to 
remember for political action. The first is that, in order to change any society for the better, one 
must have the support of the population of that society. This certainly goes without saying, but it 
is a lesson that is sometimes forgotten by the determinist model: humanist Marxism argues that 






then, should be to provide people with the tools necessary to see oppression and exploitation 
(such as the humanist dialectic), and provide options for praxis. What is done with those options 
is the choice of the people in question--revolution and reform are but two sides of the coin. The 
second point is that the result of any change is not the end of the dialectic. If the dialectical 
model accurately reflected reality--if it were, in fact, ontological--then it might be argued that 
there would come a point where class antagonism at last came to an end. However, no dialectical 
process, as both myself and others have argued, truly ends. New divisions within society are as 
inevitable as it was once thought utopia would be. The point of Marxism, then, is to provide 
humanity with a goad--a constant demand to identify and oppose oppression in whatever form it 
takes. It demands that human beings continue to act in defiance of that oppression wherever it is 
found, but can offer no permanent solution. Instead, humanist Marxism can only provide us with 
a tool that can enable human beings to continue the struggle. Humanist Marxism has for its goal, 
not an unseen utopia of communism, but real human beings who are aware of the consequences 
of their actions within their societies, and who can make choices that may, in some small 
fashion, make the world better. It offers us no guarantee of success, only the tools to continue the 
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